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INTRODUCTION
In October 2015, a Black teenager at Spring Valley High School in
Columbia, South Carolina had her cell phone out in her math class.1
Her teacher told her repeatedly to put it away. Repeatedly she
refused. The teacher then called a school administrator, who
similarly instructed her to put away her phone. The student
continued to refuse. The administrator then called the school
resource officer (“SRO”), the uniformed, armed deputy sheriff
assigned to the school.2 The SRO came and informed the student
that she had to put away her cell phone.3 When the student again
refused, the officer arrested her for the crime of “disturbing schools.”4
Other students in the classroom recorded the arrest on their cell
phones.5 The video footage captured the SRO pulling the teenager

1. The incident described here is set forth in detail in Section I.A, infra.
2. A federal statute defines an SRO as a “career law enforcement
officer . . . assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in
collaboration with schools and community-based organizations . . . .” 34 U.S.C.
§ 10389(4) (2015). By a memorandum of agreement between the local school district
and county sheriff’s department, the latter assigned deputy sheriffs to Spring Valley
High School. See infra note 96.
3. See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text (describing the events at Spring
Valley High School in greater detail).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010).
5. Several news stations published articles reporting on the incident that
included footage of these recordings. See Sarah Aarthun & Holly Yan, South
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out of her desk and appearing to throw her across the classroom floor.
The officer also arrested a second student who encouraged her
classmates to record the arrest and vocally objected to it. Students
posted their videos, which soon went viral. The incident quickly
joined a long list of other incidents involving questionable use of force
by SROs. It also contributed to the larger debate about policing
tactics, especially those tactics directed at Black individuals and
communities.
The incident initially garnered national attention due to the SRO’s
use of excessive force. But the Spring Valley High School incident
also illustrates how specific incidents of relatively minor school
misbehavior lead to arrest and prosecution rather than school-based
intervention.6 This incident was a product of a series of choices: by
educators who asked an SRO to become involved in a classroom
management situation, and by the SRO who agreed to do so and who
chose to make two arrests. These kinds of decisions are replicated in
a range of cases which have been dubbed the school-to-prison
pipeline.7 The result—children charged with criminal or delinquent
acts for school misbehavior—is strongly criticized for imposing an
overly punitive and harmful law enforcement response on situations
that would be better handled through school discipline.8
The decisions that lead to school-based arrests, like those at the
center of the Spring Valley incident, do not happen in a vacuum. This
Article will use that incident and South Carolina’s broader experience
to analyze the laws, policies, and legal practices that create the legal
architecture of the school-to-prison pipeline—and also identify
promising, but incomplete reforms that have taken root in South
Carolina. Reforming individual elements of that architecture will
help limit this problem, but the problem can only be completely
Carolina Student’s Violent Arrest Caught on Video; Officer Under Investigation,
CNN (Oct. 27, 2015, 12:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/us/south-carolinaspring-valley-high-school-student-video/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9VS7-2PGC];
Erik Ortiz & Craig Melvin, South Carolina Deputy Ben Fields Fired After Body
Slamming Student: Sheriff, NBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2015, 12:34 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sheriff-announce-south-carolina-deputyben-fields-be-fired-sources-n452881 [https://perma.cc/UW3F-ZRB8].
6. The focus of this Article is on direct examples of the school-to-prison
pipeline—incidents at school that trigger arrests and/or charges. Indirect examples,
in which some combination of severe school discipline, poor education, and excluding
children from regular schools creates criminogenic circumstances, are outside the
scope of this Article.
7. For a history and critique of the school-to-prison pipeline metaphor, see
generally Ken McGrew, The Dangers of Pipeline Thinking: How the School-toPrison Pipeline Metaphor Squeezes Out Complexity, 66 EDUC. THEORY 341 (2016).
8. E.g., infra notes 40–42.
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solved by reforming all elements. The legal architecture involves
several interlocking legal elements that together cause school
discipline issues to become law enforcement issues.
First, the Spring Valley incident illustrates how criminal law
broadly encompasses many incidents at schools that would be better
handled as school discipline matters than as juvenile delinquency
matters. It is a crime in South Carolina to disturb a school “in any
way.”9 This statute was used to charge both girls in the Spring Valley
incident—and more than 1300 other South Carolina children that
same year, making it the second most frequent delinquency charge in
the state that year.10 The racial disparities for this charge are
tremendous, even when compared to the already large disparities in
the juvenile justice system as a whole.11 Although South Carolina’s
criminal law is particularly broad—perhaps the broadest in the
nation—other states are not far behind.12
Second, the Spring Valley incident reveals how legal instruments
direct SROs’ involvement in situations that school officials should
handle on their own. SROs are usually uniformed, armed officers
employed by local police departments and assigned to schools.13
There has been a significant national focus on encouraging school
districts to enter into memoranda of agreement with law enforcement
agencies to establish shared understandings between schools and law
enforcement agencies regarding SROs’ roles, and to limit those
roles.14 The Spring Valley school district had a memorandum of
agreement with the local sheriff’s department that both placed SROs
at middle and high schools in the district and required school officials
to refer any criminal action to those SROs.15 Consistent with the
memorandum of agreement, the Spring Valley High School
administrator called in an SRO to assist with a disobedient but nonviolent student. The Spring Valley experience thus demonstrates the
importance of creating such memoranda of agreement with provisions
to prevent school discipline matters from becoming matters for law
enforcement.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420(A)(1)(a) (2010).
10. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Section II.A.1.
13. A federal statute defines an SRO as a “career law enforcement
officer . . . assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in
collaboration with schools and community-based organizations . . . .” 34 U.S.C. §
10389(4) (2015).
14. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
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The Spring Valley experience also demonstrates the need for
statutory reform. In addition to the requirements under the
memorandum of agreement, a South Carolina statute requires schools
to refer certain other behavior—such as some schoolyard fights—to
law enforcement.16 That state statute requiring reporting was enacted
at the height of tough-on-crime reforms of a generation ago.17 This
statute serves to transform school disciplinary incidents into law
enforcement incidents unnecessarily. Like other legislation of that
era, it is now ripe for reform.
Third, South Carolina illustrates a problem with the structure of
diversion programs.18
Diversion programs are often excellent
alternatives to prosecuting children, but they are too often operated
by law enforcement, thus requiring law enforcement involvement.19
Moreover, frequently used programs require a child to first be
charged so that law enforcement or prosecutors can admit them to the
program.20 In contrast, many schools do not operate their own
diversion programs.21 This can lead school officials and police
officers to charge children criminally with a goal of directing them to
a law enforcement-operated diversion program.22 Such actions can
sometimes lead to prosecution and conviction contrary to the intent
of the school officials or police officers initiating that process.23 More
broadly, locating diversion programs within law enforcement agencies
rather than schools requires law enforcement involvement in
incidents that school officials could handle on their own. Thus,
accessing those programs requires transforming school discipline
matters into law enforcement matters. Developing more diversion
programs operated by schools would avoid this unnecessary
involvement with law enforcement.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994).
17. 1994 S.C. Acts 299.
18. See infra Section II.C. A diversion program is designed to help the child
understand his or her error, to prevent its recurrence, and to prevent a prosecution of
that child—that is, to divert the child from the juvenile justice system. Some
diversion decisions are made after a charge is referred to juvenile courts, and others
(typically involving programs operated outside of law enforcement) are made before
any charge, thus eliminating the need for a charge.
19. See infra Section II.C.
20. See GEORGE W. APPENZELLER ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA
JUVENILE
ARBITRATION
PROGRAM
12
(2011),
http://www.swsolutionsinc.com/Library/Reports/2011_SCDJJ_ArbitrationProgram.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZN4X-5PPT] (describing a commonly used diversion program in
South Carolina as one for children “charged with committing” certain offenses).
21. See infra Section II.C.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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Fourth, the Spring Valley incident reveals concerns about the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to prosecute,
dismiss, or divert school-based charges. In our juvenile justice system,
such decisions should consider both the state’s ability to prove a child
guilty of a crime and whether prosecuting a child for that crime is
necessary to protect the public or to rehabilitate the child.24 Contrary
to the latter principle, the local elected prosecutor in the Spring
Valley incident left charges pending against the two girls for months
before dismissing them.25 The prosecutor wrote that he did not
believe the publicity around the event would permit him to have a fair
trial.26 The elected prosecutor did not state any consideration of
whether prosecution would serve the juvenile justice system’s
rehabilitative purposes,27 illustrating a more widespread problem of
how authorities exercise prosecutorial discretion without adequately
considering whether rehabilitating a particular child requires
prosecuting him or her.28
This Article will also address post-Spring Valley reform efforts in
South Carolina. These reform efforts are significant, but incomplete.
There are both local and statewide reforms that seek to limit arrests
and charges for school misbehavior, and these reforms have had some
success. In Richland County (where the Spring Valley incident
occurred), reforms have reduced arrests by sheriff’s department

24. This historic rehabilitative purpose has been stated for decades. See, e.g.,
Wallace Waalkes, Juvenile Court Intake—A Unique and Valuable Tool, 10 CRIME &
DELINQ. 117 (1964) (quoted in WILLIAM SHERIDAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 53
(1966)).
25. See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
26. Letter from Dan Johnson, Solicitor, Fifth Judicial Circuit to Captain John
Bishop, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (Sept. 2, 2016), regarding South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division Investigative File No. 32-15-0130, at 11
[hereinafter Solicitor Investigation Summary], http://www.scsolicitor5.org/Portals/2/
SLED%20Investigative%20Flie%20No%20%2032-15-0130%20-%20Spring%20Valley
%20Matter.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NLJ-9HEX].
27. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM STRUCTURE & PROCESS:
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF DELINQUENCY SERVICES (2013),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04205.asp?qaDate=2012
[https://perma.cc/F28C-JVSG] (analyzing juvenile justice purposes clauses in state
statutes and finding the vast majority of states endorse rehabilitative goals). South
Carolina’s statute endorses rehabilitative goals. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-350(7)
(2008).
28. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family Court Prosecutors: Elected and

Agency Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and Child
Protection Cases, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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SROs by more than fifty percent, and statewide, changes in practice
have cut disturbing schools charges in half.29
The South Carolina Senate has passed a bill dramatically
narrowing the scope of the disturbing schools offense.30 The bill’s
fate will depend on South Carolina House of Representatives action
when it reconvenes in 2018. Passing this bill would represent
significant progress, but only partial reform. An original analysis of
South Carolina data shows that limiting disturbing schools
prosecutions has historically led to authorities using other charges
instead.31 If the pending bill is enacted, it will likely screen out some
of the more extreme fact patterns, but will not stop the larger flow of
children through the school-to-prison pipeline. Recent declines in
disturbing schools charges have occurred without any enacted
disturbing schools statutory reforms—showing that powerful levers of
change exist beyond such legislation.
This Article will also analyze efforts to improve the legal limits on
SROs’ activities in schools. The county in which the Spring Valley
incident took place has made some significant progress, especially
through a voluntary agreement between the county sheriff’s
department and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).32 This
agreement identifies a range of minor crimes as school discipline
matters in which SROs should not be involved.33 Less promising
efforts to revise the memoranda of agreement between the sheriff’s
department and local school districts show an ongoing need for
stronger provisions to distinguish law enforcement from school
discipline.34 The revised memoranda encourage but do not require
officers to decline to charge children for minor incidents.35 Yet, the
revised memoranda continue to require school officials to report to
SROs any incident that amounts to a crime.36 This is in tension with
the provisions of the voluntary agreement, and leaves SROs with the
discretion of what to do next. Thus, the revised memoranda seek to
change the culture of SRO involvement in school discipline, but fail
to change the legal elements that permit it.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra notes 298, and 325–26 and accompanying text.
See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.A.2.
See infra Section III.B.1.a.
See infra notes 336–37 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.B.1.b.
See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
See infra note 345 and accompanying text.

90

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

One statewide reform has made significant progress on limiting the
role of SROs. A 2017 South Carolina Department of Education
regulation limits when school officials can refer minor incidents to law
enforcement.37 Such referrals are only lawful when an incident poses
an immediate safety risk or the student has engaged in at least three
such incidents in that school year.38 It also requires that districts and
law enforcement agencies incorporate such limits in their memoranda
of agreement.39 This regulatory change holds the greatest promise for
statewide reforms for limiting the pipeline. But the regulation alone
is not enough because it leaves important implementation questions
to local school districts.
Reforms to other pillars of the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal
architecture remain relatively untouched. The South Carolina statute
requiring schools to report many incidents to law enforcement has not
been changed. Public schools have not developed a wide set of
diversion programs. No formal steps have been taken to affect the
exercise of delinquency charging discretion.
This Article does not address several key issues related to the
school-to-prison pipeline, including points that other scholars have
already established. First, it does not rehash the description of the
school-to-prison pipeline or trace its history.40 Second, this Article
takes as a given that there is a significant difference between law
enforcement and school discipline; common school misbehavior like
disobedience and fights should not trigger arrests or juvenile
delinquency charges absent relatively severe factors like serious
injuries, weapon possession, or drug distribution. Third, United
States schools, family courts, and juvenile justice systems have too
often failed to prevent school misbehavior from forming the basis of
juvenile delinquency charges.
The school-to-prison pipeline
contributes to this failure and it requires reform. Other scholars have
established these points in detail.41 Fourth, this Article does not
37. See infra note 356.
38. See infra note 357–58.
39. See infra note 362.
40. For an illustrative summary of the pipeline and its history and growth, see
Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 919, 929–45 (2016) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Police, and the School-toPrison Pipeline]; Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools
for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313, 324–31 (2016) [hereinafter Nance, Tools for
Change].
41. E.g., Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note
40, at 929–45; Nance, Tools for Change, supra note 40, at 324–31; Catherine Y. Kim,
Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 864 (2012). See generally Barbara
Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565 (2016).
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address non-legal reforms described by other scholars, which can
establish “more pedagogically sound methods to address school
violence” than arresting students.42 These include improved training
and supervision of SROs, classroom management training of teachers,
school innovations to improve school-wide discipline, and the
development of a variety of school-based diversion programs—
crucially important topics, but beyond the scope of this Article. Fifth,
this Article does not address searches and surveillance of students at
school and how such actions (and related Fourth Amendment
doctrines) may further the school-to-prison pipeline.43 Finally, this
Article does not address how punitive school discipline and academic
challenges at school can lead to delinquency and adult crime—an
important component of the school-to-prison pipeline. Rather, this
Article focuses on incidents at school that lead directly to arrests or
charges, and the purely legal reforms necessary to dismantle that
portion of the school-to-prison pipeline’s architecture.
Part I will describe the Spring Valley incident in detail, including its
immediate aftermath and legal reform efforts it inspired. In so doing,
Part I will explain why this incident and South Carolina’s broader
experience is worth focusing on. Part II identifies the elements of the
pipeline’s legal architecture illustrated by the Spring Valley incident
and South Carolina more broadly. Part III explores reform efforts in
South Carolina and notes some significant but incomplete progress
that has occurred. Part III argues that discrete reforms, while
positive, will not be enough to stem the flow of cases through the
pipeline or to keep recent progress from eroding; more
comprehensive reform is required.
I. CASE STUDY: THE SPRING VALLEY INCIDENT AND THE SCHOOLTO-PRISON PIPELINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
This Part will describe the Spring Valley incident itself—both its
well-publicized facts and other details that are equally important to
drawing lessons from the incident. This Part will also explain why this
incident, and South Carolina’s experience more generally, deserve
particular attention.
42. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 40, at
978.
43. See generally, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities,
and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765 (2017); Josh Kagan, Reappraising

T.L.O.’s ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement
Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291 (2004); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to
the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School
Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067 (2003).
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A. The October 26, 2015 Spring Valley High School Incident
The facts of what happened at Spring Valley High School on
October 26, 2015 are well established.44 A teenager, whose name is
sealed, had her mobile phone out in her third period algebra I class.45
Her teacher told her to put away her phone, and she did.46 The
teacher then assigned the class to do class work on a website.47 He
used a separate program to monitor what students were doing on
their individual computers.48 Through that program, he saw that the
student had opened her email.49 He used his remote access to close
her email. She re-opened it and he re-closed it remotely three or four
more times.50
The teacher walked up to the student and “noticed that she had her
cell phone in her lap. He asked the student to give him her cell
phone, at which point she refused and told [him] to ‘get out of her
face.’”51 He then wrote a discipline referral and asked the student to
leave the class and she refused.52 He repeated the instruction to leave
and she repeatedly refused.53 At this point, there was no suggestion
that she was interfering with any other student’s work.54
The teacher contacted a high school administrator—the equivalent
of an assistant principal in many schools. The administrator came to
the classroom and asked the student several times to leave the
classroom with him. “The student sat quietly and refused to comply

44. The South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division and the FBI both
investigated the incident, which was also the subject of significant media attention.
Except as noted, the summary of facts relies on the official investigations as
summarized by the elected solicitor based on law enforcement investigations. See
Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26. Other accounts abound. E.g.,
ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK
WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR 72–73 (2017); Alan Blinder, Ben Fields, South
Carolina Deputy, Fired Over Student Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/south-carolina-deputy-ben-fields-fired.html
[https://nyti.ms/2iPRC9e]; Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Nov. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2016/11/how-america-outlawed-adolescence/501149/ [https://perma.cc/PQX3-Y7WK].
45. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
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with [the administrator’s] directives or respond to him in any way.”55
The administrator then called the SRO Benjamin Fields and
explained the situation to that officer when he arrived.56 The
administrator gave the student a final warning, noting the “deputy is
here” and asked her to leave a final time; she refused.57
The SRO asked the student to come with him several times and she
continued to refuse. As the elected solicitor (the South Carolina term
for elected local prosecutor,58 equivalent to the district attorney in
other jurisdictions) later summarized: “Fields subsequently informed
the student that she was under arrest for disturbing schools and
attempted to place her under arrest. While Fields was attempting to
effectuate a lawful arrest, an altercation between himself and the
student occurred.”59 That “altercation” began when Fields used
physical force to pull the non-compliant student out of her desk. One
video showed the student resisting by “striking Deputy Fields in the
face with her fist when his hand makes the initial contact with her
arm.”60 The video reveals only this single strike, which was not
forceful enough to stop or delay the deputy’s actions or cause any
reported injury. The deputy successfully pulled the student out of her
desk, which tipped over and fell to the floor, leaving the student on
the floor. He then “threw”61 the student (as the local sheriff later put
it) several feet away from the desk. In recordings widely publicized,
one can hear the officer then say, “[p]ut your hands behind your
back” as he completed the arrest of the student as classmates looked
on.62
After the arrest, authorities took the student to a hospital. Doctors
noted several injuries, including “a minor nondisplaced fracture at the
distal radial physis [a wrist bone].”63
When the SRO first entered the class, another student, Niya
Kenny,64 encouraged students to record the incident and objected to
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 24.

Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 2.
Staff Reports, Richland Co. Sheriff Leon Lott’s Statement on Firing of
Deputy Ben Fields, THE STATE (Oct. 28, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.thestate.com/
news/local/crime/article41712405.html [https://perma.cc/3B42-CWE5].
61. Id. (“The one [action] that concerns me the most was the throwing of the
student across the floor.”).
62. See Aarthun & Yan, supra note 5.
63. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 9.
64. Kenny’s name was made public because she was charged as an adult. She also
has spoken frequently about the incident to the media and is the lead plaintiff in the
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how the SRO handled the situation. Several other students recorded
the “altercation” on their mobile phones and circulated the
recordings, which soon reached media outlets.65 After the SRO
arrested the first student, Kenny said, “[h]e turned around and he was
like, ‘Oh, you have so much to say, you’re coming, too.’”66 The SRO
initially arrested Kenny for disorderly conduct but later submitted
paperwork to charge her with disturbing schools.67
The SRO charged both the first student and Kenny with disturbing
schools.68
B.

The Incident’s Aftermath

Thanks to the students who recorded the incident and posted those
recordings on social media, the incident—or at least the final
moments captured on video—quickly became well known.
Within two days, the Richland County sheriff fired Deputy Fields.69
In doing so, the sheriff did not question whether the student with the
mobile phone had committed a crime or whether Fields should have
arrested her. Rather, he focused on the force used during the arrest,
especially “the throwing of the student across the floor.”70 The sheriff
also requested an FBI investigation into the incident.71
Firing Fields did not have any immediate effect on the charges
Fields filed against either child; both continued to face disturbing
schools charges. By December, advocates delivered a petition to the
office of the Richland County solicitor demanding that he drop the
charges.72 The solicitor responded with a public statement saying that

class action challenging the use of the disturbing schools charge. See Complaint at 4,
Kenny v. Wilson, No. 16 Civ. 2794 (D.S.C. filed Aug. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Kenny v.
Wilson Complaint], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/kenny_v_
wilson_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU7K-WL3X].
65. See, e.g., WIS Staff, FBI to Lead Investigation of Violent Incident at Spring
Valley High School, WISTV.COM (Nov. 19, 2015, 3:41 PM), http://www.wistv.com/
story/30353999/video-shows-confrontation-between-spring-valley-student-and-school
-resource-officer [https://perma.cc/9EE4-9753] (posting three videos of the arrest).
66. Evie Blad, She Recorded Her Classmate’s Arrest, Then Got Arrested, Too:
Q&A with Former Student Niya Kenny, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/sherecorded-her-classmates-arrestthen-got.html?print=1 [https://perma.cc/TL76-DENU].
67. See Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, ¶ 86.
68. Id.
69. See Staff Reports, supra note 60.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See WIS Staff, Solicitor: No Involvement in Charges Against Spring Valley
HS Teens Until FBI Investigation Over, WISTV.COM (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:34 AM),
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he would decide whether to prosecute the charges “based only on
evidence and in accordance with the law” and that he would await
results of the FBI investigation before making a final decision.73 The
solicitor’s statement made no reference as to whether prosecuting the
girl who refused to put away cell phone74 (or delaying a decision
pending the FBI investigation) was in her best interest or served the
juvenile court’s rehabilitative mission.
When the FBI concluded its investigation,75 the solicitor
announced that he would dismiss the charges against the two girls.76
The solicitor wrote that he believed the first student “did disturb the
school,” but the termination of the officer and “administrative
action . . . taken against school personnel” made winning a conviction
difficult.77 The solicitor again engaged in no analysis of whether
prosecuting the child served any rehabilitative purpose.78 The
solicitor concluded that he could not prove that Kenny was guilty of
disturbing schools.79
Dismissing the charges was certainly a positive development for the
two girls (as it would be for any defendant), and research, including
studies of South Carolina juvenile cases, suggests that this dismissal
may have reduced the likelihood of either girl engaging in any future
crime.80 Nonetheless, the dismissal could not erase harms caused by

http://www.wistv.com/story/30763259/black-parents-association-wants-chargesagainst-teens-dropped [https://perma.cc/GVB2-9CYB].
73. Statement of Dan Johnson, Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.wistv.com/story/30773582/read-solicitor-johnsons-statement
[https://perma.cc/U8YT-DYSW]; see also WIS Staff, supra note 72 (describing
advocates’ efforts and the solicitor’s response).
74. Kenny was seventeen years old at the time of the incident and, following
South Carolina law limiting family court jurisdiction to children under seventeen, was
charged as an adult. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2008).
75. Federal authorities announced they would not charge Deputy Fields with any
civil rights violations. Cynthia Roldán, Former School Officer Will Not Be Charged,
Sues Sheriff, School District, THE STATE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.thestate.com/
news/local/crime/article126379009.html [https://perma.cc/ULD4-W9M9].
76. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 11.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Prosecuting rather than dismissing first-time charges was found to increase the
likelihood of recidivism, with particularly strong results for misdemeanor offenses
like disturbing schools. The only exceptions found were for youth “who have [ ] been
diagnosed with an aggression-related mental disorder,” who had similar levels of reoffending following a misdemeanor regardless of whether they were prosecuted.
David E. Barrett & Antonis Katsiyannis, The Clemson Juvenile Delinquency Project:
Major Findings from a Multi-Agency Study, 26 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 2050, 2051–52
(2017).
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the arrests and charges. Multiple studies have identified that arrests
and charges—even when ultimately dismissed—increase the odds that
children will drop out of high school.81 For instance, Gary Sweeten
found that a “first-time arrest during high school nearly doubles the
odds of high school dropout.”82 Niya Kenny’s story illustrates this
harm. After her arrest at school, Kenny did not return to Spring
Valley, and instead enrolled in a GED program.83 Later litigation
brought on her behalf asserted that “due to the humiliation and
anxiety she experienced, Ms. Kenny did not feel that she could return
to Spring Valley High School.”84 By her own account, the arrest
triggered “the worst anxiety,” when police officers, or others who
reminded her of the incident, came into the fast food restaurant
where she worked.85 Soon after the event, she stated: “I used to kind
of, you know, just start crying. There were times my mom had to
come pick me up from work because I just, I couldn’t deal with it.”86
Because the first student was charged in family court and has not
publicly spoken about the incident, the effect of the incident on her
and the charges against her are not publicly known.

81. Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by
Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 463 (2006) (noting earlier research
reaching this conclusion). Other studies reach similar conclusions. See generally, e.g.,
Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile Arrests on High School
Dropout, 82 SOC. EDUC. 368 (2009); Randi Hjalmarsson, Criminal Justice
Involvement and High School Completion, 63 J. URB. ECON. 613 (2008); David S.
Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational Damage in
the Transition to Adulthood, 86 SOC. EDUC. 36 (2010).
82. Sweeten, supra note 81, at 473. Sweeten found that cases requiring court
appearances (as must occur when charges are not diverted or dismissed) “nearly
quadruples the odds of dropout.” Id.
83. Scholars and education leaders have argued that “people with GEDs are, in
fact, no better off than dropouts when it comes to their chances of getting a good
job.” Claudio Sanchez, In Today’s Economy, How Far Can a GED Take You?, NPR
(Feb. 18, 2012, 5:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/18/147015513/in-todayseconomy-how-far-can-a-ged-take-you [https://perma.cc/6Z8T-BXSL]; see, e.g., James
J. Heckman, John Eric Humphries & Nicholas S. Mader, The GED 423, 425 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16064, 2010) (summarizing a body of
research as showing that “GEDs are not equivalent to ordinary high school
graduates” and that “[c]ontrolling for their greater scholastic ability, GEDs are
equivalent to uncredentialed dropouts in terms of their labor market outcomes and
their general performance in society.”).
84. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 17.
85. Blad, supra note 66.
86. Id.
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Why Focus on Spring Valley and South Carolina?

The incident at Spring Valley High School could have occurred in
any part of the country and, indeed, similar incidents have occurred
elsewhere.87 The Spring Valley incident “catalyzed a national
conversation about the involvement of police officers in the
administration of school discipline.”88 The incident is worthy of
analysis for that reason alone. Two additional reasons explain why
this incident, and South Carolina more broadly, are worthy of a
particular focus: the incident effectively illustrates the legal
architecture of the school-to-prison pipeline; and reform efforts that
followed the incident both illustrate the possibility of effective
changes and allow for analysis of which reform efforts are most
impactful.

1.

Spring Valley and South Carolina Illustrate the Pipeline’s Legal
Architecture

Multiple legal rules overlap to form the school-to-prison-pipeline’s
legal architecture. As Part II will explain in more detail, South
Carolina cases and data illustrate the role of statutory, judicial,
regulatory, and contract law in shaping incidents like the arrests at
Spring Valley. A focus on statewide trends will capture how the
pipeline operates in the aggregate, beyond any single incident.
Relatedly, multiple factors have rendered the school-to-prison
pipeline particularly active in South Carolina. According to an
Education Week analysis of 2013–2014 data, South Carolina ranks
second in the nation in the percentage of schools with an assigned
SRO, and eighth in the nation for percentage of students arrested.89
Prior research indicates that this result should cause no surprise. For
87. See DEREK W. BLACK, ENDING ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 94 (2016) (noting “numerous” stories of “school resource
officers and officials choking, handcuffing, restraining, and locking up in isolation
rooms elementary and middle school students, including those with special needs”);
Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to Be Arrested at School,
EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/blackstudents-more-likely-to-be-arrested.html
[https://perma.cc/C874-7X3Z]
(listing
examples in Virginia, Missouri, and Alabama); Jason P. Nance, Rethinking Law
Enforcement Officers in Schools, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 151, 151 (2016)
[hereinafter Nance, Rethinking Law Enforcement Officers in Schools] (“Indeed,
evidence of law enforcement officers mishandling student disciplinary problems
abound.”).
88. Fedders, supra note 41, at 565.
89. Policing America’s Schools: An Education Week Analysis: Which Students
Are Arrested the Most?, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/medias/
ew/19policing/index.html#/overview [https://perma.cc/PP2K-WF2G].
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example, Jason Nance empirically studied strict security measures
including the presence of police officers at schools.90 He concluded
that the percentage of minority students enrolled at a school predicts
the use of such security measures, even when controlling for other
variables such as school and neighborhood crime rates.91 In addition,
larger schools, urban schools, and southern schools all are more likely
to have stricter security measures.92 Spring Valley High School fits
part of the profile for schools where one might expect strict security
measures and resulting arrests. Spring Valley’s student population is
52% Black.93 It is a large school—enrolling more than 2000
students94—and is located at the edge of Columbia,95 South Carolina’s
capital city. By contract between the Richland County School
District Two and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, two
sheriff deputies were assigned to Spring Valley as SROs.96
Still, Spring Valley is far from alone, and far from the top of the list
for school arrests. Spring Valley’s arrest rate of 0.531% is higher than
the national average, but it still ranks below 127 other South Carolina
90. See generally Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1
(2013) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race]. Nance defined “strict
security measures” this way: “Strict security measures include using metal detectors,
conducting random sweeps for contraband, hiring law enforcement officers or guards,
controlling access to school grounds, and installing security cameras. These
measures, particularly when used in combination, can create an intense, prison-like
environment that deteriorates the learning climate.” Id. at 5.
91. Id. at 41; see also Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to
Be Arrested at School, EDUC. WK., (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.edweek.org/
ew/articles/2017/01/25/black-students-more-likely-to-be-arrested.html?print=1
[https://perma.cc/YE8L-T735] (reporting that Education Week analysis of federal
data shows “that black students are more likely than students in any other racial or
ethnic group to attend schools with police”).
92. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 90, at 41–42.
93. SPRING VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL, 2016–2017 SIC ANNUAL REPORT (2017)
[hereinafter SPRING VALLEY ANNUAL REPORT], https://www.richland2.org/Richland
District/media/Richland-District/Documents/2017%20School%20Annual%20Report/
High/Spring-Valley-SIC-Brochure-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V53Y-JQS8].
94. SPRING VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL, 2015 SOUTH CAROLINA STATE REPORT CARD
(2016) [hereinafter SPRING VALLEY REPORT CARD], http://ed.sc.gov/assets/report
Cards/2015/high/c/h4002069.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG4Q-FSZ3]. Other sources list a
lower enrollment of 1885 students. See Policing America’s Schools: An Education
Week Analysis: South Carolina School Data, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter
South Carolina School Data], https://www.edweek.org/medias/ew/19policing/
index.html#/state/SC [https://perma.cc/U2AZ-N85U].
95. Spring Valley High School is located between U.S. Route 1 and Interstate 20,
north of Fort Jackson and a 20–25 minute drive from the South Carolina State House
in downtown Columbia.
96. Memorandum of Agreement between Richland County School District Two
and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department for the 2015–2016 School Year (Mar.
1, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Richland 2—RCSD 2015–16 MOA].
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high schools (there are 1225 total), whose arrest rates range up to
29.310%.97 Spring Valley also does not fit other stereotypes; it is a
relatively high-achieving school98 with a diverse student body.99 The
incident thus demonstrates that the school-to-prison pipeline can exist
even at a relatively high-achieving school.

2.

Intensive Advocacy in South Carolina for Reform

South Carolina is also worthy of a case study because of intensive
advocacy efforts underway within the state, which illustrate both the
promise and the difficulty of the work required to prevent the
juvenile justice system from being used to handle school discipline
matters.
Reform efforts were beginning even before the Spring Valley High
School incident. In the school district in which Spring Valley is
located, a group of parents formed the Richland Two Black Parents’
Association in 2014 and focused on the number of Black students,
especially Black boys, subject to suspension and expulsion.100 The
DOJ Office of Justice Programs, Office for Civil Rights began
reviewing the Richland County SRO program prior to the Spring
Valley incident.101 This review resulted from “data collected by the
DOJ and other federal agencies on the county’s juvenile population
and arrest rates; information on school-based arrests, referrals to law
enforcement and exclusionary discipline in the county; and concerns
about the SRO program voiced by Richland County community
members.”102
97. South Carolina School Data, supra note 94 (providing data by percentage of
arrest and allowing the author of this Article to sort and count the number of schools
listed above Spring Valley).
98. SPRING VALLEY REPORT CARD, supra note 94, at 3 (listing graduation rates
and end of course test scores which compare favorably to state averages).
99. Rather than a segregated school, Spring Valley is a picture of diversity.
SPRING VALLEY ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 2 (noting the demographics of
students and staff as “52% African American, 28% White, 10% Hispanic, 6% Asian,
4% Other”).
100. Carolyn Click, New Richland 2 Parent Group Wants to Discuss Race, THE
STATE (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/article13845191.html
[https://perma.cc/K888-MRVE].
101. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, 15-OCR-67, LETTER RE: COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF THE RICHLAND COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 3 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER],
https://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/RCSD-SRO-ComplianceReview-08102016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJK7-XBPZ]. The DOJ letter refers to actions taken before the
October 2015 incident at Spring Valley High School. See id. (noting site visit by DOJ
Office of Civil Rights staff in September 2015).
102. Id.
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Reform efforts accelerated after the Spring Valley incident. The
General Assembly considered a bill (sponsored by a legislator whose
district includes Spring Valley High School) to dramatically narrow
the disturbing schools statute.103 The American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
disturbing schools and disorderly conduct statutes against students
attending their schools.104 The South Carolina Department of
Education convened a Safe Schools Task Force with a goal of
reviewing policies and regulations that may have contributed to the
incident or to other less well-publicized problems.105 The Richland
County Sheriff’s Department entered a voluntary resolution
agreement with DOJ requiring reforms to its SRO program.106 The
sheriff’s department and local school districts renegotiated their
memoranda of agreement to include more provisions to discourage
arresting and charging students.107
These reform efforts have made some important progress. The
number of disturbing schools charges have dropped by half, and
particularly strong reductions have occurred in Richland County.108
A bill to narrow the disturbing school statute passed one house of the
South Carolina General Assembly.109
The South Carolina
Department of Education promulgated regulations limiting when
schools can refer routine school discipline matters to SROs.110 But
South Carolina’s historical and recent reform efforts also illustrate a
final point—the need to reform multiple pieces of law. Because
multiple pieces of law form the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal
architecture, reforming only one or two will leave others contributing
to the pipeline.
103. S.
131,
122nd
Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg.
Sess.
(S.C.
2017),
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/131.htm [https://perma.cc/RP9DT94M].
District Court granted
104. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64.
defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs have appealed. Id. The case is
currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See also
infra notes 270–75 and accompanying text. In addition, Niya Kenny filed a tort suit
against the Richland County Sheriff’s Department and the Richland County School
District 2 seeking damages for false imprisonment, defamation, negligence, and
negligent hiring and supervision. Kenny v. Richland County Sheriff’s Dept., 2017-CP40-05034 (filed Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/357039190/NiyaKenny-Lawsuit#download [https://perma.cc/3YE9-65BN].
105. See infra note 356.
106. DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, at 1.
107. See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
108. Infra notes 298–99 and 324–30 and accompanying text.
109. See infra Section III.A.1.
110. See infra Section III.B.2.
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II. SPRING VALLEY INCIDENT REVEALS THE PIPELINE’S LEGAL
ARCHITECTURE
The Spring Valley incident, and the broader practice of charging
children for misbehavior at school, results from at least four legal
elements, which form the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal
architecture.
The first element is the broad criminal law.111 The charge of
disturbing schools permits law enforcement authorities to treat a wide
swath of student behavior as crime.112 This section will analyze the
disturbing schools statute and its operation in South Carolina, and
how it illustrates problems with similar statutes in nearly half of all
states, as well as other broad misdemeanor statutes elsewhere.
The second element is how SROs’ prominent role in school
discipline incidents can transform those incidents into criminal or
delinquency charges.113
Multiple years of research have not
established whether SROs improve school safety, but they have
clearly shown that SROs’ presence significantly increases the
likelihood that students will be arrested and charged with relatively
minor offenses.114
It is less clear if the law can effectively cabin SROs’ role. This
section will explore the laws and legal instruments governing the
SRO’s involvement in the Spring Valley incident, and explain how
those laws permitted, if not encouraged, transforming a school
disciplinary incident into a criminal justice matter. At a minimum,
the Spring Valley incident illustrates the necessity of more effectively
distinguishing the SRO’s law enforcement role from school discipline,
and thus keeping SROs out of school discipline matters.
Third, while many youth-focused diversion programs exist, they are
largely operated through law enforcement agencies or prosecution
offices, leading authorities to involve SROs in discipline matters or to
charge children as a means of accessing such programs.115 The intent
to use such programs is commendable, but placing them outside of
schools leads to the unnecessary involvement of law enforcement in
school discipline matters.

See infra Section II.A.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010).
See infra Section II.B.
Fedders, supra note 41, at 571; Nance, Students, Police, and the School-toPrison Pipeline, supra note 40, at 948–54.
115. See infra Section II.C.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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Fourth, prosecutorial discretion too often deemphasizes the
essential determination of whether prosecuting children is necessary
to protect the public or to rehabilitate children.116
Such a
consideration was notably absent from the elected prosecutor’s public
statements about the Spring Valley incident.
Restoring that
consideration would help limit charges and prosecutions of incidents
that schools can handle better than courts.
A. Wide Criminal Law: Disturbing Schools Statutes and Their
Disparate Impact

1.

Statutory Terms Criminalizing Ordinary School Misbehavior

The breadth of South Carolina’s criminal law was an essential legal
piece that transformed a student’s non-violent non-compliance with a
teacher into two criminal charges. The SRO arrested the two girls for
the crime of disturbing schools. Specifically, in South Carolina, it is a
crime “for any person willfully or unnecessarily (a) to interfere with
or to disturb in any way or in any place the students or teachers of any
school or college in this State, (b) to loiter about such school or
college premises or (c) to act in an obnoxious manner thereon.”117
The law is incredibly broad—disturbing a school “in any way” is a
crime,118 so it is easy to see how school officials or the officer
concluded that the child who refused to put away her cell phone or
leave the classroom at her teacher’s instruction had committed a
crime. Following a detailed investigation, the local elected prosecutor
concluded that the first student did disturb the school.119 But even
the prosecutor concluded that Niya Kenny’s conduct—objecting to
the officer’s conduct—did not rise to a crime.120 Authorities have
used this charge with great frequency—1324 disturbing schools
charges were sent to South Carolina family courts in 2015–2016,
making it the second most frequent delinquency charge.121 Several
hundred more individuals ages seventeen and older were charged
with disturbing schools as adults.122
116. See infra Section II.D.
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010).
118. Id.
119. Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 11.
120. Id.
121. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2015–2016, at
13 (2016) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2015–2016], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2015-1
6%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT3J-DWZW].
122. Under current law, juvenile court jurisdiction ends at seventeen, which is set
to change to eighteen in 2019. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2008) (defining child
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South Carolina’s statute is one of many. At least twenty other
states have some kind of statute criminalizing misbehavior at
school,123 many of which prosecute similarly large numbers of
children under their statutes.124 The Atlantic concluded that more
than 10,000 disturbing schools charges are filed nationally each
year.125 Beyond state statutes, many municipalities also outlaw
disturbing schools.126
Many jurisdictions with disturbing schools statutes have had
officers arrest students under disturbing schools statutes for nonviolent conduct that would be more appropriately treated as school
discipline than as delinquency matters. In New Mexico, for instance,
a seventh grade student was arrested for “interfere[nce] with the
educational process” for a series of burps.127 As the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit later summarized the alleged crime, the
child “had generated several fake burps” in gym class, “which made

under current law as under seventeen); 2016 S.C. Acts 1751 (redefining child as under
eighteen). Statistics for seventeen-year-olds (and older individuals) charged with
disturbing schools are difficult to find because those charges are filed in local
summary courts and no statewide data is tracked. When the South Carolina Revenue
and Fiscal Affairs Office estimated the impact of a bill to narrow the disturbing
schools statute (discussed in Section III.A.1), it reported 132 convictions for
disturbing schools in 2015–2016. S.C. REVENUE & FISCAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
STATEMENT OF ESTIMATED FISCAL IMPACT S. 0131, at 2 (2017), http://rfa.sc.gov/files/
impact/S0131%202017-01-10%20Introduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2W6-JEYS]. That
figure only includes results from twenty-seven percent of magistrate’s courts, and
only includes prosecutions, excluding cases that were dismissed or diverted. Id. The
total number of disturbing schools charges filed against those seventeen and older is,
therefore, likely to be several hundred.
123. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-21-606
(West 2005); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32210 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9109 (West 2005); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14, § 4110 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 871.01 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6804 (2001); MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 26-101 (West 1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-23 (West 1970); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 20-1-206 (West 1947); NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 392.180 & 392.910(2) (2016);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:11 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13 (West 1970); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-06-16
(West 1999); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-11-1 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 13-32-6 (2017); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.635.030 (West 2017); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-6-14 (West 2017).
124. Ripley, supra note 44 (reporting similarly large numbers in Maryland, Florida,
Kentucky, and North Carolina).
125. Id.
126. E.g., SELMA ALA., CODE ORDINANCES § 17-33 (2017).
127. A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1139 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
2151 (2017). This case upheld dismissal of the lawsuit for unlawful arrest against the
officer, and is notable in part because it featured a stinging dissent by then-Judge Neil
Gorsuch. See id. at 1169–70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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the other students laugh and hampered class proceedings.”128 The
teacher then told the child to sit in the hallway, but “he leaned into
the classroom entranceway and continued to burp and laugh.”129 The
teacher called the SRO, who arrested the child.130 In another New
Mexico case, an SRO arrested a fourteen-year-old for texting in class
and refusing to turn over her cell phone.131 In Texas, children were
arrested for using perfume and throwing a paper airplane in school.132
In New York, children have been arrested for writing on their desks
with markers.133 In Connecticut, a student was arrested for allegedly
stealing a beef patty from the cafeteria.134 The student’s brother was
arrested when he asked officers why they were arresting (and using a
Taser against) his brother.135
States need not have a disturbing schools statute on the books to
charge children for petty misbehavior. When the DOJ investigated
the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department, it interviewed an SRO
who reported arresting students, mostly for “minor offenses—
Disorderly Conduct, Peace Disturbance, and Failure to Comply with
instructions.”136 Other cases around the country involving a variety
of charges for relatively minor misbehavior at school have been

128. Id. at 1129.
129. Id. at 1129–30.
130. Id. at 1130.
131. G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (D.N.M. 2013).
132. Chris McGreal, The US Schools with Their Own Police, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/09/texas-police-schools
[https://perma.cc/5SAT-JDD8]. Texas effectively repealed its disturbing schools
statute in 2013. See infra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
133. Stephanie Chen, Girl’s Arrest for Doodling Raises Concerns About Zero
Tolerance, CNN (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/18/
new.york.doodle.arrest/index.html?hpt=C1 [https://perma.cc/XP4K-R6SY].
134. Claire Michalewicz, Mom of Boy Tasered in High School Cafeteria Files
Lawsuit, MIDDLETOWN PRESS (June 14, 2011), http://www.middletownpress.com/
general-news/20110614/mom-of-boy-tasered-in-high-school-cafeteria-files-lawsuitdocuments?viewmode=fullstory [https://perma.cc/QJ2N-7EHK].
135. Id.
136. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 37 (2015) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT], https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=95274 [https://perma.cc/
YQ4X-XARP].
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catalogued,137 including charges against young children with autism
and other disabilities.138
South Carolina is notable for having one of the broadest, if not the
broadest, disturbing schools statutes in the nation. South Carolina is
the only state that criminalizes behavior which disturbs a school “in
any way”—a phrase absent from other states’ otherwise similar
statutes.139 Moreover, South Carolina’s broad language contrasts
with limiting language in several other states’ statutes.140 For
example, Arizona limits “interference with or disruption of an
educational institution” to behavior involving threats of physical
injury or threats of damage to any educational institution.141
Nevada’s statute requires any disturbance to be created
“maliciously.”142 New Hampshire limits its statute’s scope to “[a]ny
person not a pupil,” thus excluding students who misbehave at their
own school.143 Colorado only criminalizes disturbances “through the
use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation or when force
and violence are present or threatened.”144
Importantly, South Carolina courts have declined to narrow the
scope of the disturbing schools statute, in contrast with other state
courts which have done so. Westlaw reports only six South Carolina
cases in which children appealed their convictions for disturbing
schools, and every decision that ruled on the meaning of the statute
affirmed the convictions.145 In the leading case, In re Amir X.S., the
137. E.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, For More Teens, Arrests by Police
Replace School Discipline, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/

articles/for-more-teens-arrests-by-police-replace-school-discipline-1413858602
[https://perma.cc/YN2R-QNE6].
138. See, e.g., Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the
Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 147–48 (2015)
(describing three such cases).
139. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010), with statutes cited supra note
123.
140. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West 2006) (“Whoever willfully interrupts or
disturbs any school . . . commits a misdemeanor . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 32210
(West 2014) (willful disturbance); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (West 2013)
(“[d]isrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students . . . .”).
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911(A)(1) (2016).
142. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.910(3) (West 2015).
143. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:11 (2017).
144. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-109(2) (West 2017); see People ex rel. J.P.L.,
49 P.3d 1209, 1211–12 (Colo. App. 2002).
145. See generally In re Michael E., No. 2006-MO-043, 2006 WL 7353470 (S.C.
2006); In re Mathew M., No. 2006-MO-044, 2006 WL 7353471 (S.C. 2006); In re Amir
X.S., 371 S.C. 380 (2006); In re Joelle T., No. 2010-UP-547, 2010 WL 10088227 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2010); In re John Doe, 318 S.C. 527, 535 (Ct. App. 1995). The only case to
reverse a conviction did so on procedural grounds. See In re Johnny Lee W., 371 S.C.
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South Carolina Supreme Court rejected an argument that the statute
was overbroad.146 It relied on the state’s strong interest “in
maintaining the integrity of its education system.”147 The court stated
that “[b]ecause the school environment is fragile by its
nature, . . . [a]ny conduct in this context that interferes with the
State’s legitimate objectives may be prohibited.”148 The Court
conceded that a “fertile legal imagination can dream up conceivable
ways” in which the disturbing schools statute might be applied to
violate First Amendment rights, but such examples were not
“substantial” enough to support a conclusion that the statute was
overbroad.149 While a future case could challenge the statute on
other grounds,150 the South Carolina Supreme Court’s rejection of the
overbreadth challenge in Amir X.S. permits the disturbing schools
statute to criminalize any behavior which disturbs a school, even
slightly.
In contrast to South Carolina, several other state courts have
limited the scope of their disturbing schools statutes, specifically
requiring a disturbance to be significant to qualify as a crime. For
example, Maryland courts have noted that various “[d]isruptions of
one kind or another” are inevitable any time large groups of children
come together.151 “[T]here is a level of disturbance that is simply part
of the school activity, that is intended to be dealt with in the context
of school administration, and that is necessarily outside the ambit of”
the disturbing schools statute.152 For a school disturbance to amount
to a crime in Maryland, it “must be one that significantly interferes
with the orderly activities, administration, or classes at the school.”153
Similarly, a New Mexico court interpreted a predecessor to its
disturbing schools statute as requiring a “more substantial, more

217, 221 (2006), (reversing a conviction based on a conditional guilty plea because
South Carolina law forbids such pleas).
146. In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. at 384, 389 (2006).
147. Id. at 390.
148. Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
149. Id. at 391.
150. In re Amir X.S. also involved a challenge to the statute as void for vagueness.
The Court held that the child lacked standing to facially challenge the statute on this
ground because “[t]here can be no doubt that Appellant’s conduct falls within the
most narrow application of § 16-17-420.” Id. at 391. A future case involving different
conduct could challenge the statute as void for vagueness. A federal lawsuit seeking
to enjoin enforcement of the disturbing schools statute on students alleges that the
statute is unconstitutionally vague. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, ¶ 106.
151. In re Jason W., 837 A.2d 168, 174 (Md. 2003).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
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physical invasion” of a school environment.154 Florida courts have
interpreted its disturbing school statute to only apply to behavior
“specifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily
impede” a “normal school function” and that the disruption must be
“material[ ].”155 The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined
criminal school disturbance to require a “substantial interference”
even though the term “substantial” does not appear in the statute.156

2.

Disparities by Race, Sex, and Disability

The Spring Valley incident, involving a White officer and two
Black girls, immediately touched a nerve about disparities in policing
generally and school-based arrests specifically. Both state and federal
prosecutors declined to charge the officer with any criminal offense,
including any civil rights offense.157 Beyond that individual case, the
large disparities in aggregate school arrests and charging decisions
both in South Carolina and nationally present a strong case that race,
sex, and disabilities have an impact on arrest decisions.
South Carolina’s experience with its disturbing schools statute and
other school-based arrests illustrates the particularly strong concerns
about racial disparities that are present in school discipline, law
enforcement referrals, and arrests across the country. Black children
make up 33% of all South Carolina children,158 and were defendants
in 56% of all delinquency cases referred to South Carolina family

154. State v. Silva, 525 P.2d 903, 907 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974). How far this decision
reaches was contested in A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1143–50 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting), the burping case discussed, supra notes 126–29 and
accompanying text. The child arrested for his disruptive burping and then-Judge
Gorsuch argued that Silva provided clearly established law that the child’s conduct
was not severe enough to justify the arrest. The officer and school defendants
argued, and the two-judge majority agreed, that Silva did not clearly apply to the
newer disturbing schools statute nor clearly exclude the middle school burper’s
conduct from the scope of the criminal law. See id.
155. J.J. v. State, 944 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quotations and
citations omitted).
156. In re Eller, 417 S.E.2d 479, 482 (N.C. 1992) (quotation and citation omitted).
157. See Solicitor Investigation Summary, supra note 26, at 11; Press Release, U.S.
Att’y Office, Dist. of S.C., Federal Officials Close Investigation into Use of Force by
School Resource Officer at Spring Valley, South Carolina, High School (Jan. 13,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sc/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-useforce-school-resource-officer-spring-valley [https://perma.cc/YR6L-EVJW].
158. Children Under 18 Years of Age by Race/Ethnicity, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.,
KIDS COUNT DATA CTR. (2017), http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6132children-under-18-years-of-age-by-race-ethnicity?loc=42&loct=2#detailed/2/any/true/
868,867,133,38,35/66,67,4262,3/12804,15653 [https://perma.cc/EU98-C7CG].

108

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

courts in 2015–2016.159 The disparities are even greater in disturbing
schools cases, in which Black children account for more than three
quarters of all defendants.160 The South Carolina Department of
Juvenile Justice published data from the 2008–2009 school year that
showed that Black boys were charged with disturbing schools at 4.9
times the rate of White boys, and Black girls were charged at 6.2
times the rate of White girls.161 A more recent study of all schoolbased arrests showed smaller, but still significant disproportionality in
arrest rates of boys and girls—Black boys were arrested 2.68 times as
frequently as White boys, and Black girls were arrested 2.95 times as
frequently as White girls.162
Similar disparities are evident nationally. The U.S. Department of
Education has reported that, nationally, Black children account for
16% of all students, but 27% of students referred to law enforcement
and 31% of school-related arrests.163 Earlier research has made clear
that different rates of misbehavior cannot explain these disparities.164
National measures suggest that, as in South Carolina,165 racial
disparities among girls are larger than among boys. Across the
country, Black boys were suspended out of school 3.33 times more
frequently than White boys,166 while Black girls were suspended out
159. S.C. REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 121, at 11.
160. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, DISTURBING SCHOOLS DATA FY 2008–2009,
slide 3 [hereinafter
DISTURBING
SCHOOLS
DATA
FY
2008–2009],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/2010%20disturbing%20schools%20presentation_files/frame.
htm [https://perma.cc/WN7G-76HW]. The ACLU alleged similar figures continue in
more recent years, with Black students “nearly 4 times as likely as their white
classmates to be charged with Disturbing Schools.” Kenny v. Wilson Complaint,
supra note 64, ¶ 76.
161. The S.C. DJJ reported that 14.2 of every 1000 Black boys were charged with
disturbing schools, compared with 2.9 for White boys. DISTURBING SCHOOLS DATA
FY 2008–2009, supra note 160, slide 5. The rates were 9.3 for Black girls and 1.5 for
White girls. Id.
162. HOLLY GROOVER, S.C. STAT. ANALYSIS CTR., STATISTICS FOR YEARS 2011–
2013 REGARDING DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY
CONTACT (DMC) IN SOUTH CAROLINA JUVENILE ARRESTS FOR OFFENSES AT
SCHOOL USING DATA FROM THE SOUTH CAROLINA INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING
SYSTEM (SCIBRS), at 1, 12 (2016), http://www.scdps.gov/ohsjp/stats/Juveniles/
Juvenile_DMC_in_Schools_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4DD-WFLW].
163. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA
COLLECTION DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 6 (2014) [hereinafter OCR DATA
SNAPSHOT],
https://ocrdata.ed.gov/downloads/crdc-school-discipline-snapshot.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65H6-ZZR4].
164. See, e.g., Am. Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero

Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review and
Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 852, 854 (2008).
165. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
166. OCR DATA SNAPSHOT, supra note 163, at 12.
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of school 6 times more frequently than White girls.167 Advocates
have argued that “[g]ender and race intersect to create categories of
girls who are especially vulnerable to certain system policies and
practices,”168 leading Black girls to account for 43% of all girls subject
to a school-related arrest.169 Advocates allege that these disparities
“are often tied to racial and cultural biases or subjective expectations
of what makes a ‘good’ girl,”170 and perceptions by both school and
law enforcement officials that Black girls are less innocent and
deserve harsher punishment than other girls exhibiting similar
behavior.171 As a result, Black girls who engaged in behavior
perceived as particularly loud or angry could be subject to
unnecessarily harsh consequences.172 Commentators have used the
arrests of the two girls in the Spring Valley High School incident to
illustrate the phenomenon.173 Advocates recommend attacking this
problem by “decriminaliz[ing] minor school-based offenses
commonly charged to girls, such as verbally disruptive behavior.”174
The intersection of race and disability is another essential factor.
Nationally, children with a disability account for 12% of all students,
but 25% of all children referred to law enforcement and 25% of all
school-related arrests.175 Similar disproportionalities exist within
South Carolina.176 Black children with disabilities encounter even

167. Id. at 14.
168. FRANCINE T. SHERMAN & ANNIE BALCK, GENDER INJUSTICE: SYSTEM-LEVEL
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMS FOR GIRLS 22 (2015), http://www.nationalcrittenton.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Gender_Injustice_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/562WBT67].
169. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC. & NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR.,
UNLOCKING OPPORTUNITY FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN GIRLS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 16 (2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/
Unlocking%20Opportunity%20for%20African%20American%20Girls_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8LR-BRA8].
170. SHERMAN & BALCK, supra note 168, at 23.
171. Rebecca Epstein et al., Girlhood Interrupted: the Erasure of Black Girls’
Childhood, GEO. U. L. CTR., CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQ. 1 (2017),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/poverty-inequality/
upload/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6FW-UW3K].
Research also
supports similar arguments regarding Black boys. Id. at 2.
172. Id. at 1.
173. E.g., RITCHIE, supra note 44, at 73.
174. SHERMAN & BALCK, supra note 168, at 39.
175. Id. at 7. Children with a disability include, for purposes of this data point,
children who have been deemed to have a disability under the Individuals with
Disability Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1401 (2012).
176. JOINT CITIZENS & LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON CHILDREN, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT
27
(2017),
http://www.sc.edu/jclcc/doc/2017_JCCLC_Annual_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UZA8-V6KS].
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more severe disparities: The UCLA Civil Rights Project calculated,
for instance, that Black students on average are about 12% more
likely to face suspension than White students, while Black students
with disabilities are 15% more likely to be suspended than White
students with disabilities.177 Using an earlier data set, the Civil Rights
Project calculated that South Carolina’s school suspension rate for
Black, White, and Hispanic children with disabilities all exceeded
national averages, as did the gap between Black and White children
with disabilities.178
Perhaps the most powerful explanation for these wide disparities
relates to implicit bias. Research has shown that different behavior
by different groups of students does not explain the disparities.179
Sarah Redfield and Jason Nance have argued that implicit biases
explain many of the large racial disparities in the school-to-prison
pipeline.180
Implicit biases are a particularly large concern in the application of
broad criminal laws like disturbing schools. An implicit bias “is an
association or preference that is unconscious and experienced without
awareness” and often (if not usually) conflicts with an individual’s
beliefs.181 Forced to make a quick decision with limited information,
an implicit bias may lead school officials or police officers to view the
behavior of Black children (or Black girls or Black children with
disabilities) as more disruptive or threatening than similar behavior
by White children, and thus take more punitive actions against Black
children.182 As the DOJ wrote in a statement of interest in Kenny v.

177. Daniel J. Losen et al., Disturbing Inequities: Exploring the Relationship
Between Racial Disparities in Special Education Identification and Discipline,

UCLA C.R. PROJECT 1, 8 (2013), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/
projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/state-reports/
disturbing-inequities-exploring-the-relationship-between-racial-disparities-in-specialeducation-identification-and-discipline [https://perma.cc/EH98-98YK].
178. Daniel J. Losen, Discipline Policies, Successful Schools, and Racial Justice,
UCLA C.R. PROJECT 1, 5 (2011), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k12-education/school-discipline/discipline-policies-successful-schools-and-racial-justice/
NEPC-SchoolDiscipline-Losen-1-PB_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/965R-UN8W].
179. See SARAH E. REDFIELD & JASON P. NANCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, SCHOOL-TOPIPELINE
PRELIMINARY
REPORT
1,
15–20
(2016),
PRISON
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/diversity_pipeline/stp_
preliminary_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/57JC-K9GV].
180. Id. at 54–56. Redfield and Nance have collected various studies which
demonstrate how implicit biases affect a range of educational decisions and
outcomes. Id. at 61–62.
181. Id. at 55.
182. See id. 61–62; see also id. at 58 (“Implicit bias is at play in discretionary
situations and influences disciplinary and other youth related decisions.”).
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Wilson, such broad statutes may “fail to provide sufficient guidance to
police,” and “officers who lack clear guidelines regarding what
conduct is criminal and when enforcement is appropriate may not
apply the law equitably, whether or not the differences in
enforcement are intentional.”183 Accordingly, it is recommended that
the American Bar Association enacts “legislation eliminating
criminalizing student misbehavior that does not endanger others.”184
B.

Legal Instruments’ Failure to Prevent Law Enforcement
Involvement in School Discipline

The Spring Valley incident also occurred because of other legal
structures that put the SRO in a position to enforce the broad
criminal law. The SRO was not only stationed at the school, but he
became a key feature of school discipline. His role was not limited to
protecting students from assailants with weapons, or even responding
to situations which might reasonably be considered security risks,
such as the suspected presence of illegal drugs. Rather, the SRO was
the person called by the school administrator to enforce the teacher’s
and the administrator’s direction that the student leave the
classroom.185 His role in the Spring Valley incident illustrates
Catherine Kim’s conclusion that “schools increasingly rely on law
enforcement to maintain order,” to the detriment of overall student
outcomes.186
Various authorities have argued for a much more limited role for
SROs. Noting the harms to students from school-based arrests and
the racial disparities among such arrests, the U.S. Department of
Education in 2014187 recommended that SROs’ role “focus[ ] on
protecting the physical safety of the school or preventing the criminal
conduct of persons other than students, while reducing inappropriate
student referrals to law enforcement.”188 SROs, according to the U.S.

183. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 12–13. DOJ argued that other
broad and vague criminal statutes had similar problems. Id. at 14–17.
184. REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 179, at 13.
185. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text (describing how the SRO was a
step in a chain of progressive discipline).
186. Kim, supra note 41, at 864.
187. The date of this guidance may prove important. It was issued during the
Obama Administration, like other federal guidance noted in this Article. Although it
seems unlikely that the Trump Administration will similarly push for limits on SROs,
it is less clear if it will seek to undo Obama-era guidance.
188. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR
IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE 9 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/
gen/guid/school-discipline/guiding-principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW6M-PLY5].
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Department of Education, should be responsible for “addressing and
preventing serious, real, and immediate threats to the physical safety
of the school and its community,” but not have any involvement with
“routine discipline matters.”189
One leading recommendation for keeping SROs out of regular
school discipline has been for school districts and law enforcement
entities to enter into memoranda of agreement that clearly delineate
what SROs will and will not do.190 This recommendation was
followed by the local authorities at the time of the Spring Valley
incident—a memorandum of agreement (“MOA”) was in place
between the local school district and the sheriff’s department.191 But
the MOA failed to stop the SRO from becoming involved in a school
disciplinary matter and arresting and charging the two girls for
disturbing schools, in part because it required school officials to
inform SROs of any criminal conduct at school.192 The MOA’s
failure illustrates an essential point: if districts are to permit SROs in
their schools, it is important both that MOAs exist, and that their
terms effectively keep SROs out of regular school discipline.
The MOA in effect during the Spring Valley incident represents a
middle spot between proposed memoranda, which do not provide
much meaningful guidance, and those that significantly limit when
schools can turn students over to SROs and when SROs can arrest or
charge students. Spring Valley High School’s MOA was based on a
template designed by the DOJ program which funded many SROs
around the country.193 The DOJ summarized a model memorandum
in 2013 and recommended that memoranda of agreement list some
examples of what SROs would do, but did not recommend any terms
which would limit SROs’ role.194 The National Association of School

189. Id. at 10.
190. See id. at 3, 10 (encouraging schools to “provide clear definitions of the
officers’ roles and responsibilities on campus” and “document those expectations in a
written agreement or memorandum of understanding”); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF
SCH. RES. OFFICERS, NASRO POSITION STATEMENT ON POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN
STUDENT DISCIPLINE (2015), https://nasro.org/news/nasro-updates/nasro-positionstatement-police-involvement-student-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/77LD-HGGS]
(“A Clear and Concise Memorandum of Understanding is Essential.”); Nance,
Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 40, at 982.
191. See Richland 2—RCSD 2015–16 MOA, supra note 96.
192. See infra notes 204–206 and accompanying text.
193. S.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., SOUTH CAROLINA SAFE SCHOOLS TASKFORCE REPORT 5
(2016), http://scsba.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-schoollaw-presentation-taks
force-richardson.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ6L-ZMF2].
194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FACT
SHEET: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR FY2013 SCHOOL-BASED
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Resource Officers (“NASRO”) recommended sample memoranda
which more actively blur the line between SRO duties and school
discipline. One such model states that SROs should “be an extension
of the principal’s office” and should be involved in both “law
enforcement matters and school code violations.”195
NASRO
suggests a difference between law enforcement and school discipline,
stating that SROs should bring students to the principal’s office for
punishment for school discipline code violations.196 But involvement
in school disciplinary incidents—even if theoretically limited to
escorting students to the principal’s office—risks transforming school
discipline matters into arrests or charges. Such a concern is consistent
with the empirical record, which shows that SRO presence at schools
increases the likelihood of arrests, “even for low-level violations of
school behavioral codes.”197
And the Association’s proposed
memoranda impose no limits on when school officials can refer
situations to SROs or when SROs may arrest or charge children for
minor offenses.198
In contrast, the Advancement Project (a civil rights advocacy
organization) proposed a sample memorandum of understanding
(“MOU”) that would only permit school officials to refer students to
SROs if an incident created a risk of “imminent harm.”199 When
SROs do get involved, the Advancement Project’s proposed MOU
would prevent arrests or charges for minor offenses. Fights, for

PARTNERSHIPS 2 (2013), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2013_MOU-FactSheet_v2_0916
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT5X-N8EK].
195. NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER
AGREEMENT
2
(2012),
https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
MOUsampleA2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY7L-8F3E].
196. Id. at 2–3. The Association offers two other sample memoranda. Although
their language varies, the bottom line policies are consistent. NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH.
RES. OFFICERS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE __ POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE __
SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR THE SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM (2012),
https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MOUsampleC2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AWC3-9XGZ] (template memorandum of agreement); NAT’L
ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM AT ___ SCHOOLS (2012), https://nasro.org/cms/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/MOUsampleB2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SJ2H-WXDP]
(template memorandum of understanding).
197. REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 179, at 53.
198. See generally sample memoranda cited supra note 196.
199. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AND POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2013),
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/cf357b9f96d8c55ff8_rdm6ib9js.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6Q35-UJ4B]; Fedders, supra note 41, at 571.
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instance, could only trigger arrests or charges if they caused “serious
bodily harm” or “necessitate[d] medical treatment.”200
The Richland County MOA201 attempted, but largely failed, to
limit SROs’ role—thus making it more like the federal and NASRO
models than the model pushed by advocates like the Advancement
Project. The Richland County MOA’s failure thus illustrates
weakness in the federal and NASRO models. The MOA includes
language reflecting the understanding that a line exists between law
enforcement and school discipline. “First and foremost the SROs will
perform law enforcement duties in the school such as handling
assaults, theft, burglary, bomb threats, weapons, and drug
incidents.”202 Moreover, the Richland County MOA states that an
“SRO shall not act as a school disciplinarian, as disciplining students
is a school responsibility.”203 Despite those efforts to distinguish law
enforcement from school discipline, the MOA’s very next sentence
turns school disciplinary incidents into matters for law enforcement:
“However, if the incident is a violation of the law, the principal shall
contact the SRO or their supervisor in a timely manner and the SRO
shall then determine whether law enforcement action is
appropriate.”204 Thus, by contract, any time a student violates broad
criminal laws—like disturbing schools, disorderly conduct, or breach
of peace—school administrators must notify police.205 Any fight or
petty theft—a student taking another’s cell phone, for instance—
would trigger law enforcement involvement, with no consideration of
whether the school could or should properly handle such actions
without law enforcement.206
The Richland County MOA language was particularly important
because no other source of law limited SROs’ role. One statute
defined SROs and clarified that they are empowered to arrest any
200. Id.
201. The MOA is also notable for the financial cost imposed on the district. In the
year of the Spring Valley incident, the Richland County School District Two paid the
Richland County Sheriff’s Department $690,992 for nineteen sheriff deputies to serve
as SROs at fourteen separate schools (two each were assigned to high schools,
including Spring Valley). Richland 2—RCSD 2015–16 MOA, supra note 96, at 1.
The cost of SROs has been criticized for “tak[ing] away needed resources that could
otherwise be used to hire more counselors, mental resources specialists, and
implement the alternative programs” to arrests and school exclusions. Nance, Tools
for Change, supra note 40, at 339.
202. Richland 2—RCSD 2015–16 MOA, supra note 96, at 2.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id.
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individual for “crimes in connection with a school activity or schoolsponsored event” anywhere in the state.207 But this statute offered no
limitation for when SROs should exercise such authority.208 No law
or regulation existed requiring a district to have an MOA, let alone
governing what might be included in such an MOA. Similarly, school
district discipline policies did not limit the role of SROs, and, in fact,
read as if law enforcement should provide disciplinary back-up to
teachers. The Richland County School District Two 2016–2017
handbook noted that teachers can handle most discipline problems.209
But “in cases where the student’s behavior affects the safety or
learning opportunities of other students,” further action is authorized,
including action in conjunction with local law enforcement
agencies.210 Notably, behavior which might affect other students’
“learning opportunities” would involve a much wider range of
conduct than criminal activity, let alone criminal activity that creates
safety risks.
One South Carolina statute even encouraged schools to report
some incidents to law enforcement. A statute enacted in 1994
requires schools to:
[C]ontact law enforcement authorities immediately upon notice that
a person is engaging or has engaged in activities on school property
or at a school-sanctioned or -sponsored activity which may result or
results in injury or serious threat of injury to the person or to
another person or his property as defined in local board policy.211

The statute’s timing is notable. It was enacted in an era when
juvenile crime rates peaked, and when states widely enacted a range

207. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-12 (2013).
208. Id. South Carolina statutes include only one limitation on the role of SROs—
SROs are exempted from a statute requiring police officers to investigate whether
certain individuals are present lawfully in the country. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13170(B)(6) (2011). A federal court enjoined enforcement of the statute, so this
limitation is moot. United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012)
(enjoining enforcement), affirmed 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).
209. RICHLAND SCH. DIST. TWO, 2016–2017 BACK-2-SCHOOL HANDBOOK, at 14
(2016), https://www.richland2.org/RichlandDistrict/media/Richland-District/
Advanced/Standard%202/2.1/2-1-2016-2017-Richland-Two-Employee-Handbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FM9X-YTWS].
210. Id.; see also RICHLAND SCH. DIST. TWO, STUDENT DISCIPLINE (2017),
https://www.richland2.org/Departments/Administrative-Services/Student-Services/
Student-Discipline [https://perma.cc/YT4T-K2Z5] (providing that when “the
student’s behavior affects the safety or learning opportunities of other students,
additional disciplinary action must be taken”).
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994).
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of “tough-on-crime” juvenile justice reforms.212 This statute was not
triggered by the student’s refusal to put away her cell phone in the
Spring Valley incident—that behavior did not threaten, let alone
cause, any injury. But it would apply to a range of other common
behavior, such as schoolyard fights or threats, which a school district
could consider to fall under the statute.213
As with South Carolina’s disturbing schools statute,214 the state’s
statute requiring schools to report certain behaviors to law
enforcement is among the broadest in the nation.215 The DOJ even
held it up as a model of a strong reporting statute in 2002 (though the
DOJ did not evaluate concerns that too much reporting might call law
enforcement attention to situations that did not require it).216
But South Carolina is not alone—other states have reporting laws,
but their breadth varies, as Jason Nance has catalogued.217 Some
require schools to inform police of any “violent, disruptive
incidents”218 or any assault at school, even if it does not cause any
Other states require reporting, but in narrower
injury.219
circumstances, such as in cases of criminal bullying,220
“intimidation,”221 or possession of controlled substances or
weapons.222

212. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 1, 59 (1996),
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/statresp.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y3U-AASP] (describing wideranging, tough-on-crime reforms); Barry Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327,
327–28 (1999) (arguing that increasing juvenile crime rates, racialized fear of crime,
and decreasing faith in rehabilitation triggered “tough-on-crime” reforms).
213. See 2010 WL 2678697, at *2 (S.C.A.G. 2010) (offering attorney general’s
opinion that “a school district is required to report all suspected crimes to law
enforcement”).
214. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2010).
215. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
216. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS
OF CRIME, REPORTING SCHOOL VIOLENCE 2–3, 5 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_
archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin2/welcome.html [https://perma.cc/6F5F-XKY9].
217. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 40, at
934–36.
218. ALA. CODE § 16-1-24(b) (2014).
219. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279-3:1(A) (West 2014).
220. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d(b)(15) (2014).
221. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a.1 (2014).
222. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902(c) (West 2013).
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Diversion Programs Available Through Law Enforcement, Not
School

Authorities do not prosecute every child who an officer arrests or
charges, and officers sometimes do not intend for children they arrest
or charge to be prosecuted. A large number are diverted. That is, the
child-defendant is offered the opportunity for charges against him or
her to be dropped if he or she participates in a program designed to
help the child understand his or her error, take steps to avoid
repeating that error, and/or make amends with the victim.223
One problem, however, is created when law enforcement agencies
operate diversion programs and when there are insufficient schoolbased diversion programs. That scenario furthers the school-toprison pipeline by inducing officers to arrest and charge children who
they do not wish to prosecute, and school officials to involve officers
in disciplinary matters as a means of accessing diversion programs.
Law enforcement diversion programs are good alternatives to
prosecution, but not to school discipline.
A challenge exists in the structure of such programs when, as in
South Carolina, accessing them most easily occurs through police
departments or prosecutors’ offices, rather than purely through
schools.224 This practice furthers the school-to-prison pipeline both
through the arrest or charge itself—which can label the child
delinquent—and because sometimes such cases inadvertently lead to
prosecutions. The Spring Valley incident does not illustrate this
issue—there is no public record suggesting that the SRO wanted
either child he arrested to be diverted or that the solicitor considered
it. But the practice certainly exists in South Carolina.
The practice is illustrated through a case handled by the author’s
juvenile defense clinic which arose from a different high school in
Columbia, South Carolina.225 A sixteen-year-old was accused of petit
larceny for stealing cash from a guidance counselor’s desk.226 The
boy was caught on video, confessed, and apologized to the guidance
223. S.C. REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 121, at 5. (The South Carolina
Department of Juvenile Justice, for instance, reports that thirty-five percent of all
referrals to family court are diverted. Forty-five percent are prosecuted and the
remainder are dismissed.).
224. See, e.g., APPENZELLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 12 (describing South
Carolina’s “Youth Arbitration Program” as involving youth charged with crimes).
225. References to cases handled by the Author are protected by confidentiality
laws. For more information, see Redacted Petition (on file with the author).
226. In South Carolina, petit larceny covers theft of money or goods up to $2000.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(A) (2012). In the case described, the child was accused
of stealing less than $400.
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counselor. He was also punished by the school with a long-term
suspension requiring him to attend an alternative school for the
remainder of the school year. The guidance counselor and SRO
agreed that the boy did not need to be charged or convicted. They
did want him to agree to pay back the money that was stolen, and
knew that a diversion program operated by the sheriff’s department
would require restitution payments. So they charged him, and
included with his charging documents a form recommending that he
be permitted to participate in that program. But that program
refused to accept the child because he had previously completed
(successfully) a diversion program for an earlier minor offense. So
the solicitor proceeded to prosecute the case. After students working
in the juvenile defense clinic got involved, the child offered to pay
back the money and the guidance counselor wrote a statement asking
the prosecutor to drop the charges, which she did.
This case reveals the harms that can come from depending on law
enforcement referrals for diversion programs. Simply facing these
charges, which included court appearances, increased this child’s
likelihood of dropping out of high school fourfold.227 In addition, one
wonders what would have happened to this child had his student
attorneys not explored each avenue for a dismissal, and how many
other children who lack such representation are prosecuted and
convicted.228
This process shows how the existing legal structure funneled a boy,
who authorities did not even want to charge, into the legal system.
All the victim of this crime wanted was restitution. As the child’s
guidance counselor, he determined that a diversion program, which
would require restitution, was the most effective way to both hold the
child accountable and help prevent him from committing other
crimes. Yet this teacher had no school-based diversion program to

227. Sweeten, supra note 81, at 463.
228. Advocating for diversion options is an element of strong juvenile defense
counsel. See ROBIN WALKER-STERLING ET AL., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR.,
ROLE OF JUVENILE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 22 (2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/youth_at_risk/SUPP2-NJDCROC.pdf [https://perma.cc/U33F-4L7K]. One assessment of juvenile defense in
South Carolina noted that juvenile defenders could advocate to the solicitor to refer
children to diversion programs, but that the majority of defenders surveyed did not
do so. See MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., SOUTH
CAROLINA JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE: A REPORT ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 30 (2010),
http://childlaw.sc.edu/frmPublications/SC%20Juvenile%20Defense%20Assessment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64NA-7LQA].
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turn to. The only perceived option was turning the child’s mistake
into a law enforcement matter.
This example shows that access to such diversion programs is
structured inadequately because it requires school officials and SROs
to arrest and charge individuals.229 One of the most frequently used
diversion programs in South Carolina—and the program in the case
study above that the guidance counselor and SRO recommended—is
an “arbitration” program, a form of victim-offender mediation
informed by restorative justice principles.230 The program is designed
“[to] bring[ ] together the juvenile offender, victim, and community
directly or indirectly under the guidance of a trained volunteer to
determine what actions the offender must take to restore and
enhance justice.”231 This program is similar to a large number of
restorative justice programs that exist around the country.232 In
South Carolina, this program is operated by local prosecutors’ and
sheriffs’ offices through a contract with the Department of Juvenile
Justice (“DJJ”).233 DJJ guidelines define who is eligible and exclude
any child who has a prior offense.234 That provision excluded the
child in the case study. These guidelines contain rather strict criteria,
especially when compared to leading efforts in other jurisdictions to
limit the school-to-prison pipeline by preventing charges for a list of
misdemeanors unless it is the third offense in a single school year.235
The South Carolina status quo also stands in contrast to a leading
diversion structure in place in Clayton County, Georgia, outside
Atlanta. In place of arrests or charges (even those expected to lead to
diversion programs), schools refer children directly to school-based
programs.236 Similarly, the U.S. Department of Education in 2016
229. As noted in the Introduction, a full exploration of various diversion programs
that could be appropriate for minor school-based offenses which currently lead to
delinquency charges is beyond the scope of this Article.
230. APPENZELLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 1.
231. Id. at 1, 11–13 (describing the program and similar programs nationally).
232. Id. at 11 (noting “many” similar programs).
233. Id. at 12.
234. Id. at 13 (noting eligibility is limited to first time offenders).
235. See, e.g., CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOL PROTOCOL AGREEMENT 5,
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/Clayton%20Co.%20School%20Protocol%20Ag
reement%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH3A-YPVS] (“Misdemeanor type delinquent
acts involving offenses against public order . . . shall not result in the filing of a
complaint alleging delinquency unless the student has committed his or her third or
subsequent similar offense during the school year . . . .”).
236. Even a second offense in the same school year leads to a school-based
diversion program. See id. at 6. A third or subsequent offense in the same school
year could lead to a court complaint. Id. at 5–6; see also Evie Blad, Atlanta Schools
Start Over with Police, EDUC. WK. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/
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urged schools to develop more “corrective, non-punitive
interventions, including restorative justice programs and mental
health supports.”237 Such programs should “eliminate overreliance
on SROs in schools.”238 In Denver, for instance, restorative justice
programs have helped reduce school-based law enforcement referrals
significantly.239 But such structures were not available or considered
during the Spring Valley incident. In South Carolina, an easy path to
similar programs is through law enforcement referrals.
D. Prosecutorial Discretion
When SROs decide to charge children, the charges are funneled to
juvenile court authorities, who must determine whether to prosecute,
divert, or dismiss each case. These intake decisions are important in
their own right and may also affect school and SRO decisions whether
to arrest or charge children in the first instance.240 These decisions
are especially important when the criminal law has a particularly wide
scope, giving authorities tremendous discretion to determine which
school misbehavior will be prosecuted.241
Juvenile court intake decisions have long been essential features of
our juvenile justice system, and have distinguished that system from
the criminal justice system for adults.242 A central principle is that
juvenile court authorities should consider two factors when deciding
articles/2017/02/08/atlanta-schools-start-over-with-police.html [https://perma.cc/DT
M2-M93E] (describing how an Atlanta program modeled after the Clayton County
program encourages school officials “to channel misdemeanor offenses and
delinquent acts through a tiered system of interventions rather than immediately
filing court complaints”).
237. John B. King, Jr., Key Policy Letters Signed by the Education Secretary or
Deputy Secretary, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Sept. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Dear Colleagues
Letter], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/160907.html [https://perma.cc/
96U7-798L]; see also Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline,
supra note 40, at 981 (recommending school-based restorative justice programs).
238. Dear Colleagues Letter, supra note 237.
239. E.g., Thalia González, Keeping Kids in Schools: Restorative Justice, Punitive
Discipline, and the School to Prison Pipeline, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 281, 334 (2012).
240. See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in
Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 383, 430 (2013) (“By declining to prosecute categories of
adolescent behavior, prosecutors set the standard for juvenile court intake and over
time may significantly influence patterns of arrest and referral.”).
241. See Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 191–92 (2017) (describing wide prosecutorial discretion in
juvenile courts and how that can lead to overcriminalization); see also supra Section
II.A.1–2 (describing how broad criminal laws create significant discretion which
permits implicit biases to operate).
242. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 28.
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whether to prosecute a child: first, whether they can prove a child has
committed a crime and, second, whether prosecuting a child for such
a crime is necessary to protect the public or to serve the juvenile
justice system’s rehabilitative ends.243 As a result, juvenile courts
should practice “judicious nonintervention.”244 The second factor, in
practice, ought to screen out many school-to-prison pipeline cases
from juvenile court dockets.
Here too, the Spring Valley incident is instructive because of the
unusually public statements about whether to press the disturbing
schools charges, and the concerning absence of any consideration of
that essential second factor in those statements. The Richland
County solicitor issued two public statements regarding the disturbing
schools charges filed by the SRO against the two girls.245 Both
statements emphasized whether evidence could prove the girls guilty
of the crime.246 Neither statement discussed whether prosecuting the
charges would help rehabilitate them or protect the public, or even
noted such questions as an element of prosecutorial discretion.247
One earlier South Carolina disturbing schools case illustrates a
similar concern. The case involved a ten-year-old elementary school
student who hit a teacher’s aide.248 By his own admission, he then
“proceeded to scream as loud as he could for one hour.”249 Then,
while sitting in an administrative office, he said he tried to kill himself
when a police officer walked in.250 The appellate record does not
reveal why this child was prosecuted. The bare facts reported on
appeal make one wonder whether mental health interventions might
have served this young child’s, and the public’s, interest more
effectively than the juvenile justice system. There is no provision in
South Carolina law explicitly designed to ensure that authorities fully
consider whether prosecution serves the purpose of the juvenile
justice system. Other scholarship proposes legal reforms to do so.251

243. See discussion supra Introduction.
244. THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
YOUTH CRIME: REPORT ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND CONSULTANTS’ PAPERS 96 (1967).
245. Supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
246. Supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
247. Supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
248. See In re John Doe, 318 S.C. 527, 535 (Ct. App. 1995).
249. See id. at 529, 558.
250. Id.
251. E.g., Gupta-Kagan, supra note 28.
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III. REFORM EFFORTS AFTER SPRING VALLEY AND WHY
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM IS NEEDED
Intensive reform efforts have been underway in South Carolina
since the Spring Valley High incident.252 Legislators and litigators
have targeted the disturbing schools statute.253 School districts and
law enforcement agencies in Richland County have renegotiated
memoranda of agreement regarding SROs.254 The South Carolina
Department of Education has promulgated regulations which might
limit the role of SROs to school discipline.255
This Part will explore those reform efforts. These efforts are
positive256 and have the potential to limit school-to-prison pipeline
arrests, charges, and prosecutions in South Carolina. However, these
efforts are also limited. Efforts to narrow the disturbing schools
statute are welcome—but may not stop authorities from charging
children with other offenses, and levers other than legislative changes
can lead to significant reductions in disturbing schools charges.257
Efforts to renegotiate memoranda of agreement have yielded some
improved memoranda, but still direct schools to refer all cases
involving suspected crimes (no matter how minor) to law
enforcement.258 State regulatory efforts are perhaps most promising
in that they limit SRO involvement in school discipline incidents
unless it is a more serious crime, creates an immediate safety risk, or
represents the third such crime or more during a school year.259 Yet

252. See supra Section I.C.2.
253. See infra Section III.A.1.
254. See infra Section III.B.1.b.
255. See infra Section III.B.2.
256. In full disclosure, I have had a small role in advocating for some of these
reforms. I have written and testified in favor of the bill to narrow the scope of the
disturbing schools statute. Cynthia Roldán, Senate Proposal Limiting SC’s
“Disturbing Schools” Law Hits a Snag, THE STATE (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article132992254.html [https://perma.cc/8W
AW-H5YP] (noting my testimony in favor of the bill); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Let School
Officials Handle Discipline, Police Handle Threats, THE STATE (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.thestate.com/opinion/op-ed/article41960976.html [https://perma.cc/N3V7C9R5] (urging the legislature to narrow the disturbing schools statute and school
districts and law enforcement agencies to “establish clear boundaries for school
resource officers.”). I have commented on proposed regulations, encouraging the
Department of Education to revise such regulations to more effectively limit SROs
actions to law enforcement and leave school discipline to school staff. Letter from
Josh Gupta-Kagan to Dr. Sabrina Moore (Aug. 11, 2016) (on file with author)
(regarding proposed Regulations 43-279 and 43-210).
257. See infra Section III.A.2.
258. See infra notes 345–46 and accompanying text.
259. See infra Section III.B.2.
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even these regulations leave much discretion with school officials and
SROs.260 And no significant efforts are underway to expand schoolbased diversion programs or to ensure that charging decisions
consider whether prosecuting children for school-based offenses
serves the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative mission.261
A. Narrowing Criminal Law
This section will analyze legislative and litigation efforts seeking to
narrow significantly the scope of the disturbing schools statute. It will
also explain how South Carolina’s experience beyond the Spring
Valley incident demonstrates that such efforts, while positive, will not
fully address the problem of legal practices transforming school
misbehavior into juvenile delinquency issues.

1.

Disturbing Schools Legislation and Kenny v. Wilson

In 2017, the South Carolina Senate passed a bill which would
dramatically narrow the scope of South Carolina’s disturbing schools
statute.262 The South Carolina House of Representatives did not act
on the bill before recessing for 2017, but may consider the bill when it
reconvenes in 2018.263 The bill would mostly exempt students
permitted to be at their school from the scope of the law.264 The only
way a student could be guilty of disturbing his or her own school is if
they threatened “to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon
another.”265
Advocacy for the 2017 bill includes one detail rich in historical
irony. The current version of the disturbing schools law was enacted

260. See id.
261. See infra Section III.C.2.
262. S.
131,
122nd
Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg.
Sess.
(S.C.
2017),
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/131.htm [https://perma.cc/RP9DT94M].
263. The South Carolina General Assembly recessed for 2017 on May 11, 2017.
The Joint Citizens and Legislative Committee on Children, which includes both
legislators and relevant executive agency directors, also endorsed this bill. JOINT
CITIZENS & LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON CHILDREN, supra note 176, at 28.
264. The bill would amend the disturbing schools law so that its main section would
only apply to a “person who is not a student,” defined as someone “who is not
enrolled in, or who is suspended or expelled from” the school at which any incident
occurs. S. 131 § 1(B), 122nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017),
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/131.htm [https://perma.cc/RP9DT94M].
265. Id. § 2.
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in 1968 in response to civil rights protests in South Carolina.266 The
law’s sponsor told the press, “I’m interested in keeping outside
agitators off campus.”267 The sponsor of the 2017 bill to narrow the
disturbing schools statute has used that historically resonant phrase to
advocate for her bill.268 She has argued that her bill would “take our
‘disturbing schools’ law back to its original intent, which is to protect
our (in-school) students from outside agitators.”269 A phrase used in
the 1960s to describe civil rights activists derisively is now used to
support reforming the school-to-prison pipeline, a central goal of the
contemporary civil rights movement.
Where the pending bill seeks to stop charging students with
disturbing schools, pending federal litigation seeks to enjoin
enforcement of the statute against students. The ACLU has sued the
state of South Carolina claiming to represent a class of all South
Carolina school children, with Niya Kenny as a named plaintiff,
seeking an injunction against enforcement of both the disturbing
schools and disorderly conduct statutes against them.270 The core
266. S.C. Act 943, an Act to Amend Section 16-551, Code of Laws of South
Carolina, 1962, Relating to Disturbances at Schools Attended by Women or Girls, so
as to Include All Schools Within the Provisions of the Section, 1968 S.C. Stat. 2308.
The original version of the bill, enacted in 1919, only applied to schools “attended by
women or girls.” 1919 S.C. Acts 156, § 1, 1919 S.C. Stat. 239. The 1968 amendment
struck the language regarding women and girls, thus rendering the statute applicable
to all students. The Legislature gave final approval to the expansion on March 2,
1968. 1968 S.C. Acts 943. That approval came less than one month after the
Orangeburg Massacre, in which South Carolina state troopers killed three unarmed
black men protesting ongoing segregation in Orangeburg, South Carolina. Caitlin
Byrd, To the Archives! Remembering the Orangeburg Massacre and Its Place in
POST
&
COURIER
(Feb.
9,
2017),
Civil
Rights
History,
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/to-the-archives-remembering-the-orangeburgmassacre-and-its-place/article_a89cb158-ef06-11e6-849c-03ed94e98f57.html
[https://perma.cc/HSP3-HNNU]. In yet another historical connection, Bakari Sellers,
son of Cleveland Sellers, who helped lead to civil rights protests in Orangeburg in
February 1968, now represents Niya Kenny in one of her civil suits. See id.
(discussing Cleveland Sellers’ role and Bakari Sellers’ perspective on it); see also
sources cited supra note 104.
267. Ripley, supra note 44, at 6.
268. See Mia McLeod, Why I’m Running, MIA MCLEOD FOR SENATE,
http://miaforsenate.com/blog/why-im-running/ [https://perma.cc/KG4W-V8UF].
269. Id. Local media has picked up the description as well, describing the bill as
“aim[ing] to return the disturbing schools law to its original intent of protecting
students and school staffers from ‘outside agitators.’” Cynthia Roldán, Legislators

Debating Where ‘Obnoxious Adolescent Behavior’ Ends, Criminal Behavior Begins
at SC Schools, THE STATE (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/

article137592723.html [https://perma.cc/4WEQ-LPQL].
270. The named plaintiffs include Niya Kenny—the second girl arrested for
disturbing schools in the Spring Valley incident—and several other individuals and
organizations. See Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64.
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issue is the same one litigated unsuccessfully on behalf of individual
clients discussed in Section II.A—whether the disturbing schools
statute is unconstitutionally vague.271 Kenny v. Wilson remains
unresolved.272
Notably, the ACLU litigation seeks relief that is broader than the
pending bill—an injunction against enforcing both disturbing schools
and disorderly conduct against students.273 This goal implies an
important concern: stopping enforcement of the disturbing schools
statute might prevent some of the more extreme examples of charges,
but will not limit the school-to-prison pipeline as broadly as advocates
hope. The ACLU’s complaint notes how different charges can be
interchangeable.274 For example, Kenny’s police report states that
she was arrested for disorderly conduct, but she was charged with
disturbing schools.275 Such a concern is entirely appropriate, as
discussed below.

2.

South Carolina Experience Demonstrates that Narrowing the
Criminal Law Is an Important but Insufficient Reform

The proposed bill to limit the scope of the disturbing schools
statute would likely prevent the most egregious prosecutions for
which no other criminal law is applicable—such as those at issue in
the Spring Valley High School incident. But past experiences
elsewhere in South Carolina demonstrate that authorities have used
other charges in a large number of cases and thus perpetuated the
school-to-prison pipeline.276 Those experiences contrast with the
experience of Texas where broader reforms, including narrowing the
criminal law, led to significant declines in school-based arrests.277 At
a minimum, this contrast shows that the effect of narrowing the
271. See Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 1, 3; Motion For
Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support at 17, 26, Kenny v.
Wilson, No. 16 Civ. 2794 (D.S.C. filed Aug. 11, 2016) (arguing that both § 16-17-420
and § 16-17-530 are vague).
272. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed
the case, finding that plaintiffs’ fear of arrest or charges under the disturbing schools
statute was insufficiently imminent to grant them standing to seek an injunction
against its enforcement and making no ruling on the plaintiffs’ substantive legal
claims. Id., Docket Number 90, Order, at 16–21. The plaintiffs have appealed that
ruling and the matter is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. Id., Docket No. 95, Notice of Appeal.
273. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, at 27.
274. See id. ¶ 17.
275. Id.
276. Infra notes 287–300 and accompanying text.
277. Infra notes 301–05 and accompanying text.
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criminal law may vary significantly by jurisdiction. At a maximum, it
suggests that reforming disturbing school statutes or otherwise
narrowing one portion of the criminal law without broader reforms
will only have a modest impact. Moreover, recent South Carolina
data reveal a dramatic drop in disturbing schools charges without any
statutory change—suggesting that factors other than the statute itself
are particularly impactful.278
The historic experience of Lexington County, South Carolina—a
large suburban and rural county on the west side of the Congaree
River across from Columbia—is particularly instructive. In 2010,
more than five years before the Spring Valley High School incident,
the elected solicitor decided to limit disturbing schools
prosecutions.279 In a letter to the local school superintendent, the
solicitor noted his office’s “very long” dockets and schools’ ability to
serve kids with behavior problems outside of the justice system.280 He
said his office “will no longer prosecute a juvenile’s first two offenses
of [d]isturbing [s]chools (DS) or [d]isorderly [c]onduct (DC).”281
The solicitor’s announcement had the intended effect on disturbing
schools charges—they plummeted.282 In four of the five preceding

278. Infra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.
279. Letter from Donald V. Myers, Solicitor, to Dr. Karen Woodward,
Superintendent (June 3, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Myers Letter].
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET
2015–2016 (2016) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2015–2016], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2015-2016%20County%20Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YZS-3YKN]; S.C.
DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2014–2015 (2015)
[hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2014–2015], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2015-CountyDatasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX3W-T6P8]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2013–2014 (2014) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2013–
2014], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2014%20County%20Datasheets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LR5F-U9XC]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL
COUNTY DATASHEET 2012–2013 (2013) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2012–2013],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2012-13%20county%20datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q5TQ-7RZR]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET
2011–2012 (2012) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2011–2012], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2011%20county%20datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4EG-N2JH]; S.C. DEP’T OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2010–2011 (2011) [hereinafter
S.C. COUNTY 2010–2011], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/10-11%20County%20Data
sheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLP3-DJY9]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2009–2010 (2010) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2009–
2010], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010%20county%20datasheets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6E2-GQM7]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL
COUNTY DATASHEET 2008–2009 (2009) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2008–2009],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2008-2009-County-Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S
KJ-N28T]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET

2017] THE PIPELINE'S LEGAL ARCHITECTURE

127

years, disturbing schools had been the single most frequent charge for
children referred to the Lexington County Family Court, accounting
for 98 to 161 cases in each of those preceding five years.283 After the
letter was sent, the charge dropped out of the top five most frequent
charges284 and has remained out of the top five ever since.285 Even if
the charge was a close sixth place, it would account for no more than
24 to 54 charges, depending on the year.286
But Lexington County statistics suggest that this change had, at
most, a small effect on the number of overall charges. While
disturbing schools charges declined, simple assault and battery287
charges spiked.288 This suggests that authorities charged disturbing
schools cases as something else. Where there had been 88, 61, and 89
simple assault charges in the three years preceding the solicitor’s
announcement, there were 189, 126, and 140 charges in the three
subsequent years.289 The three-year average increased by 91.2%.290
That dramatic rise would be notable under any circumstances, and is
particularly notable given the simultaneous decline in overall charges,
and the shift away from using the disturbing schools charge.

2007–2008 (2008) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2007–2008], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2008%20County%20Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/29PX-M4M5]
In Lexington County, there were 132 disturbing schools charges in 2005–06, 161 in
2006–07, 115 in 2007–08, 98 in 2008–09, and 117 in 2009–10. See sources cited supra.
Disturbing schools was the most frequent charge in Lexington County in each of
those years except 2008–09, when it was the second most frequent charge. See
sources cited supra. The solicitor announced his policy change in June 2010. See
Myers Letter, supra note 279. That is fortunate timing for statistical purposes because
the fiscal year ends in June, so the new policy coincides with the change from the
2009–10 reporting year to the 2010–11 reporting year. For every year from 2010–11
through 2014–15, disturbing schools is not on the list of top five most frequent
referrals, and the fifth most frequent charge accounted for 32, 55, 47, 25, and 52 cases
in each of those years, respectively. See S.C. COUNTY 2014–2015, supra; S.C. COUNTY
2013–2014, supra; S.C. COUNTY 2012–2013, supra; S.C. COUNTY 2011–2012, supra; S.C.
COUNTY 2010–2011, supra (noting collectively that only the top five charges are
publicly reported).
283. See sources cited supra note 282.
284. See sources cited supra note 282.
285. See sources cited supra note 282.
286. See sources cited supra note 282.
287. The Department of Juvenile Justice reports the number of “simple assault and
battery” charges per county. See sources cited supra note 282. This charge is
statutorily known as assault and battery in the third degree, a misdemeanor and the
least severe form of criminal assault. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600(E) (2015).
288. See sources cited supra note 282.
289. See sources cited supra note 282.
290. The average in the three years before the police change was 79 simple assault
charges per year, compared with 152 in the three years which followed. See sources
cited supra note 282.
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The overall number of charges in the county did drop after the
solicitor’s 2010 letter.291 However, that decline was part of a countyand state-wide trend of fewer family court referrals (which most likely
largely follows reducing juvenile crime rates). The average total
referrals in Lexington County for the three years before the 2010
letter were 19.7% higher than the average total referrals for the
subsequent three years.292 But statewide, the total number of charges
dropped even more—22.7%293—raising doubt that the Lexington
County solicitor’s policy towards disturbing schools had much of an
impact on the overall decline.
Statewide trends also suggest that authorities have historically
replaced disturbing schools with simple assault and battery charges.

291. See sources cited supra note 282.
292. The S.C. county data sheets report 1011 charges in 2007–08, 1043 in 2008–09,
and 1078 in 2009–10, for an average of 1044 per year. See sources cited supra note 282
(showing those figures had been declining from figures above 1100 in 2005–06 and
2006–07). There were 888 charges in 2010–11, 821 in 2011–12, and 805 in 2012–13, for
an average of 838 charges per year—a figure of 19.7% less than 1044. See sources
cited supra note 282.
293. For statewide totals, see S.C. REPORT 2015–2016, supra note 121; S.C. DEP’T
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2014–2015 (2015) [hereinafter
S.C. REPORT 2014–2015], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2015-Annual-StatisticalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CVN-WCPG]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2013–2014 (2014) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2013–
2014],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2014%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/56X9-QNEM]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2012–2013 (2013) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2012–2013],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2012-13%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2TF-6UTS]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2011–2012 (2012) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2011–2012],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2011-12%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KCA9-L876]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2010–2011 (2011) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2010–2011],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010-11%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8YW-Y959]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2009–2010 (2010) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2009–2010],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ9W-UWSS]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2008–2009 (2009) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2008–2009],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2008-09-Annual-Statistical-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HV3-3L8Q]; S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2007–2008 (2008) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2007–2008],
http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2008-Statistical-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6UGXWF9A].
There were 23,826 statewide charges in 2007–08, 23,111 in 2008–09, and 20,394 in
2009–10, for an average of 22,444. See sources cited supra. In the next three years,
there were 18,114 in 2010–11, 17,180 in 2011–12, and 16,754 in 2012–13, for a threeyear average of 17,349. See sources cited supra. That reflects a 22.7% decline. See
sources cited supra.
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After the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice studied
disturbing schools charges (and the racial disparities within them) in
the 2008–2009 fiscal year,294 the number of disturbing schools charges
declined—from 2339 in 2008–2009 to 1780 in the following year and
1067 in 2010–2011.295 As in Lexington County, when disturbing
schools charges declined, simple assault and battery charges picked
up much of the slack. They spiked by nearly 900 in 2010–2011, and
subsequently disturbing schools charges have crept back up while
simple assault and battery charges have crept down in tandem.296
Notably, as Figure 1 illustrates, the trend line for each charge appears
to be a mirror image of the trend line for the other.
Figure 1. The relationship between disturbing schools and simple
assault and battery charges in South Carolina Family Courts.297

The most likely explanation of these data is that when authorities
charged children for disturbing schools less frequently, they started
charging them for simple assault (and likely other charges) that could
be applied to schoolyard fights and other misbehavior. Fewer
disturbing schools charges is still a good thing. It would be difficult to
frame the Spring Valley High School student’s refusal to put away her
294. DISTURBING SCHOOLS DATA FY 2008–2009, supra note 160, at slide 5.
295. Id.
296. See infra Figure 1 and note 297.
297. For the source of the collected data presented in Figure 1, see S.C. REPORT
2015–2016, supra note 121; S.C. REPORT 2014–2015, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT
2013–2014, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 2012–2013, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT
2011–2012, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 2010–2011, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT
2009–2010, supra note 293; S.C. REPORT 2008–2009, supra note 293.
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cell phone as simple assault, and thus similar conduct would not likely
be charged if the disturbing schools statute is amended. But the close
relationship between disturbing schools and simple assault and
battery charges should give some caution to advocates for narrowing
the criminal law. That step without others will probably reduce the
number of children arrested and charged for misbehavior at school
somewhat, but is unlikely to cause more dramatic change.
South Carolina appears to be in the process of breaking this
pattern—but the bottom line is that advocates should look beyond
the scope of the criminal law. The most recent year’s data reveals a
50% decline in the number of disturbing schools charges—from 1324
in 2015–2016 to 652 in 2016–2017.298 It appears that some disturbing
schools cases are, consistent with prior practice, simply being charged
as other crimes. While overall charges decreased 12% and nonviolent charges decreased 14%,299 public disorderly conduct charges
actually increased slightly—suggesting that some disturbing schools
cases are being charged as disorderly conduct.300 Even so, the
dramatic drop in disturbing schools charges significantly outweighs
any such shift. Notably, this dramatic decline happened without any
statutory changes, as efforts to reform the disturbing schools statute
remain pending. Some other legal reforms or practice changes must
therefore explain the reduction in disturbing schools charges. This
conclusion should not discourage efforts to reform the disturbing
schools statute—it remains an overly broad and frequently used
criminal law. This conclusion should, however, focus efforts on other
reforms beyond disturbing schools legislation as even more powerful
means to limit the school-to-prison pipeline.
Texas has an instructive and optimistic experience. In 2013, Texas
narrowed its version of disturbing schools—misdemeanor offenses of
“disruption of class” and “disruption of [school] transportation”—so
they do not apply to children attending their own school.301 A
298. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2016–2017, at
13 (2017) [hereinafter S.C. REPORT 2016–2017], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/201617%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA2E-FK28].
299. Id. at 11. Total referrals decreased from 15,429 in 2015–2016 to 13,591 in
2016–2017, or 11.9%. Id. Nonviolent referrals decreased from 14,172 in 2015–2016 to
12,194 in 2016–2017, a 14.0% decrease. Id.
300. Compare S.C. REPORT 2016–2017, supra note 298, at 13, with S.C. REPORT
2015–2016, supra note 121, at 13. That some disturbing schools cases could now be
charged as disorderly conduct cases should not come as a surprise since the deputy in
the Spring Valley incident initially charged Niya Kenny with disorderly conduct. See
supra text accompanying note 67.
301. Act of Sept. 1, 2013, Tex. S.B. No. 1114, §§ 6–7 (2013),
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/billtext/pdf/SB01114F.pdf#navpanes=0
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significant change promptly followed. Citations issued to students fell
by about fifty percent immediately, and reduced school-based arrests
by one-third.302 But it is hard to attribute this decline entirely to that
statutory change, because the legislature enacted other reforms at the
same time—prohibiting officers from ticketing children at school and
requiring them to complete complaints, including sworn statements
by school officials about any disabilities the child may have and what
“graduated sanctions” the school attempted.303 And even in Texas
there was still a substitution effect, showing that the Texas reforms
did not stop authorities from using arrests as a form of school
discipline. A 2016 review of Texas data found a greater reliance on
disorderly conduct charges after the 2013 legislative change,
“suggesting that Disorderly Conduct has replaced Disruption of Class
and Transportation as a general catch-all offense.”304 Schoolyard
fights, disorderly conduct, and similar charges continue to account for
more than half of all school-based incidents which lead to court
action.305
Skepticism that narrowing the criminal law alone will dramatically
reduce school-based arrests and charges is consistent with the
experience of other states discussed in Section II.A.1. Even when
other states did not have disturbing schools statutes, authorities
charged children for petty school misbehavior by labeling it
something else—disorderly conduct or “failure to comply.”306
Relabeling relatively less severe offenses has occurred in other
juvenile justice contexts, and we should expect no different here.307

[https://perma.cc/AL6C-NE3B] (providing for the prosecution of certain
misdemeanor offenses committed by children and to school district law enforcement)
(amending TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.124 & 27.126).
302. TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. CARE FOR CHILDREN, DANGEROUS DISCIPLINE: HOW
TEXAS SCHOOLS ARE RELYING ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, COURTS, AND JUVENILE
PROBATION TO DISCIPLINE STUDENTS 11 (2016) [hereinafter TEXAS APPLESEED],
http://stories.texasappleseed.org/dangerous-discipline [https://perma.cc/XWZ8-TK
AQ].
303. Act of May 20, 2013, Tex. S.B. No. 393 § 12 http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/83R/billtext/pdf/SB00393F.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/FZE3-DGN8]
(regarding the criminal procedures related to children who commit certain Class C
misdemeanors) (codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.146).
304. TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 302, at 11.
305. Id. at 5.
306. S.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 193, at 9.
307. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Girls or Relabeled Status Offenders? An
Alternative Interpretation of the Data, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 241, 242 (2009) (arguing
that increasing arrests of girls for simple assaults, especially domestic assaults, were
relabeled status offenses after statutes limited states’ ability to incarcerate status
offenders).
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This analysis should not dissuade advocates from working to repeal
or narrow disturbing schools statutes, but rather, puts such efforts
into context. Compared with the status quo disturbing schools
statute, it would be preferable to have no disturbing schools statute
applicable at all or at least to have such a statute narrowed by
statutory language or court decision, as several states have done.308
But if either of these preferences were followed absent other changes,
one should expect only a modest limitation on the school-to-prison
pipeline, and for authorities to rely more frequently on charges other
than disturbing schools. How many school-based arrests and charges
will occur will vary from state to state. But even when large
reductions are possible, narrowing the criminal law will leave plenty
of incidents best handled at school within the boundaries of the
criminal law. Thus, narrowing efforts are helpful, but will not solve
the entire school-to-prison pipeline problem.
B.

Governing the Role of SROs

Nationally, some of the most prominent efforts to reform the
school-to-prison pipeline have focused on the role of SROs.
Ferguson, Missouri, represents a leading illustration.309 The DOJ’s
2015 investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (triggered by
protests surrounded the police shooting death of Michael Brown in
2014) included findings criticizing Ferguson SROs for “treat[ing]
routine discipline issues as criminal matters,” including frequently
charging children with “[f]ailure to [c]omply, [r]esisting [a]rrest, and
[p]eace [d]isturbance.”310 By the spring of 2016, the DOJ and
Ferguson had entered into a consent decree which called for limiting
SROs’ role.311 The consent decree requires “SRO Non-Involvement
in School Discipline” and specifically directs school officials, rather
than SROs, to handle “minor offenses committed by students,
including, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, peace disturbance,
loitering, trespass, profanity, dress code violations, and fighting not
involving a weapon and not resulting in physical injury.”312 This
provision recognizes that many incidents which fall within the

308. Supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text.
309. Cf. INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 136
and accompanying text (discussing charges filed by SROs).
310. INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 136, at
37.
311. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, 4:16-cv-00180-CDP, 48–52
(2016).
312. Id. at 50.
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boundaries of the criminal law are best framed as school disciplinary
matters rather than law enforcement matters.
But wider federal reform efforts have not adequately addressed the
role of SROs.313 The federal involvement in Ferguson made it a
unique case. The DOJ and the U.S. Department of Education’s most
recent guidance314 offers much more modest reforms. As discussed
above,315 model memoranda of agreements from the government and
NASRO at the time of the Spring Valley incident did not impose
limits on when schools could refer children to SROs or what SROs
could do in those situations. In September 2016, the Departments
offered guidance calling for some improvements in managing SROs’
activities, but which would not fundamentally limit their role. The
Departments published a “Safe School-based Enforcement through
Collaboration, Understanding, and Respect (“SECURe”) State and
Local Policy Rubric.”316 The SECURe rubric called on districts and
local law enforcement agencies to enter into memoranda of
understanding, and to “involve[ ] . . . community stakeholders in the
development of [memoranda of understanding],” citing state statutes
and regulations requiring such involvement.317 Notably, neither the
SECURe rubric nor the state laws it cited recommend or require
memoranda of understanding to contain express limits on the actions
of SROs such as those in the Ferguson consent decree. To the extent
the SECURe rubric says anything about SROs’ roles at school, it
suggests that SROs should remain involved in petty criminal matters,
such as disturbing schools, minor fights, and the like. It encourages

313. It is worth noting that some advocates have called for more dramatic reform
“ending the regular presence of law enforcement in schools.” DIGNITY IN SCH.,
COUNSELORS NOT COPS: ENDING THE REGULAR PRESENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN SCHOOLS 2 (2016), http://www.dignityinschools.org/sites/default/files/DSC_
Counselors_Not_Cops_Recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JWL-U9C2]. While
much can be said for such a call, I do not focus on it because it has not garnered much
political traction nationally nor has it played a role in post-Spring Valley reform
efforts in South Carolina. For purposes of this Article, I focus on efforts to exclude
SROs’ involvement from school disciplinary matters, and thus reduce the number of
arrests and charges arising from such matters.
314. As noted, supra note 187, it remains to be seen whether the Trump
Administration will revise this guidance.
315. Supra notes 199–205 and accompanying text.
316. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SAFE SCHOOL-BASED
ENFORCEMENT THROUGH COLLABORATION, UNDERSTANDING, AND RESPECT
(SECURE) STATE AND LOCAL POLICY RUBRIC [hereinafter SECURE RUBRIC],
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/secure-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q
XN-PUK5].
317. Id. at 2–4 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 162.215 (2016); 22 PA. CODE § 10.11
(2012); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-6.2 (2014)).

134

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

memoranda of understanding to “[e]liminate the involvement of
SROs in non-criminal matters,”318 suggesting ongoing involvement in
criminal matters.
The SECURe rubric also suggests that memoranda of
understanding should “[e]ncourage officers to minimize arrests for
minor school-based offenses.”319 This “encouragement” is welcome,
but the verb choice illustrates the guidance’s weakness; minimizing
arrests is encouraged, but fundamentally optional. To its credit, the
rubric does cite several sample memoranda of understanding with
more specific limits. 320 For example, it cited a Broward County,
Florida agreement providing that “[i]n any school year, the first
instance of student misbehavior that rises to the level of a non-violent
misdemeanor . . . should not result in arrest nor the filing of a criminal
complaint.”321 Even this MOU, however, ensures that SROs have the
discretion to arrest any child for any crime.322 Thus, model federal
memoranda continue to eschew the recommendation of advocates
like the Advancement Project, which propose memoranda that would
limit when schools can refer children to SROs and when SROs can
arrest or charge children.323
The federal guidance also urges memoranda of understanding to
require school districts and law enforcement agencies to “collect[ ],
analyz[e], and report[ ]” data regarding SROs—how often they arrest
or charge children, and the demographics (including race) of those
children.324
This section will describe efforts in South Carolina to limit the role
of SROs—and, in particular, to keep SROs away from school
discipline matters—both locally in the county where the Spring Valley
incident occurred and statewide. Locally, these efforts include a
voluntary agreement with DOJ, which mandates limits on SROs’
roles and revising memoranda of agreement regarding SROs
subsequent to the Spring Valley incident. Statewide efforts include a
2017 South Carolina Department of Education regulation limiting
when schools may involve SROs. The voluntary agreement with DOJ
and the state regulations are the most promising reforms, and limit
when schools can involve SROs more dramatically, while leaving

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 9–13.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11–12.
Supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
SECURE RUBRIC, supra note 316, at 6.
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much discretion with individual school districts.
The revised
memoranda of agreement largely track the most recent federal
guidance—they include some useful improvements but do not impose
binding limits on SRO involvement.

1.

Local SRO Reforms in Richland County

The most dramatic change in practice in South Carolina since the
Spring Valley incident is evident in Richland County, where that
incident occurred. The Richland County Sheriff’s Department—the
department that employed, and fired, the SRO involved in that
incident—reports that it dramatically reduced arrests of children by
SROs in the school year after the incident. 325 In the 2015–2016
school year, it reported 268 such arrests, compared with only 123 in
the 2016–2017 school year, a 54% decrease,326 with drug and weapon
possession charges accounting for a majority of the remaining
arrests.327 Richland County reforms led to particularly dramatic
changes compared with statewide trends. From 2015–2016 to 2016–
2017, overall juvenile court referrals declined 11.9% statewide, and
22% in Richland County.328
Disturbing schools charges fell
particularly precipitously in Richland County—from 97 in 2014–
2015329 to 62 in 2015–2016,330 to so few that the state does not report
county specific numbers in 2016–2017.331
What legal reforms caused that decline? Following the Spring
Valley incident and the DOJ’s investigation of the Richland County
Sheriff’s Department, the sheriff’s department took several steps to
prevent SROs from becoming involved in regular school discipline.
In particular, they agreed to several limits on SROs’ roles via a
voluntary agreement with the DOJ—entered into between the two
school years noted above—and negotiated new memoranda of
agreement with all of its local school districts to take effect in the
325. Deputy Chief Chris Cowan, The Richland County Sheriff’s Departments SRO
Program: Innovation and Excitement for the 21st Century, slide 19 (2017) (on file
with author).
326. Id.
327. Telephone Interview with Captain John Ewing, Richland County Sheriff’s
Dep’t (June 26, 2017).
328. S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATISTICAL COUNTY DATASHEET 2016–
2017, at 40 (2017) [hereinafter S.C. COUNTY 2016–2017], http://www.state.sc.us/djj/
pdfs/2016-2017%20County%20Datasheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KFF-HPR3].
329. S.C. COUNTY 2014–2015, supra note 282, at 40.
330. S.C. COUNTY 2015–2016, supra note 282, at 40.
331. The state reports the five most frequent charges in each county. Disturbing
schools fell out of the top five in 2016–2017 for Richland County, meaning it was at
least below 27 cases. S.C. COUNTY 2016–2017, supra note 328, at 40.
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2017–2018 school year.332 Just as the consent decree in Ferguson,
Missouri contains stronger terms than national guidelines for
memoranda of agreement, the Richland County voluntary agreement
contains stronger provisions than the revised memoranda and is the
clearest legal cause of the decline in arrests. That agreement,
however, comes with a 2019 expiration date,333 thus underscoring the
ongoing need for stronger terms in memoranda of agreement.

a.

Voluntary Agreement with the DOJ

In August 2016, the Richland County Sheriff’s Department entered
into a voluntary agreement with the DOJ, in which the DOJ ended its
investigation into the sheriff’s department early and the department
agreed to a range of steps to improve its performance.334 The
voluntary agreement provides that SROs should not engage “in
classroom management or school discipline matters that should be
appropriately handled by school staff.”335 But, where the revised
memoranda continue to require schools to report incidents to SROs,
the voluntary agreement includes provisions to keep SROs out of
such incidents. The agreement, for instance, lists a range of offenses
which “should typically be considered school discipline issues, and
should be addressed by school personnel rather than SROs.”336 That
list reads more like the Ferguson, Missouri consent decree than the
DOJ-recommended memoranda of agreement. It includes disorderly
conduct, loitering, trespass, “fighting that does not involve a weapon
or a physical injury that is more than de minimis,” and disturbing
schools, unless there is a “serious, real, and immediate threat to the
safety of the school and its community.”337
Consistent with that agreement, the department has changed many
of its internal practices with the explicit goal of learning from the
Spring Valley incident. In addition to significant training focused on
332. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement with the Richland School District Two,
Richland School District One and the Lexington-Richland School District Five
[hereinafter 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement] (on file with author). The
agreements are identical with the exception of the specific schools to which they
apply and the amount of money each district pays the sheriff’s department in
exchange for SRO services. The sheriff’s department agreement with DOJ required
it to review its memoranda of understanding with local school districts. DOJ
COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101.
333. Reforms related to the selection, training, and supervision of SROs are
beyond the scope of this Article.
334. DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, ¶ 8, ¶¶ 74–75.
335. Id. ¶ 4.
336. Id. ¶ 55.
337. Id. ¶ 55.
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alternatives to arrests and charges, and how traumas and mental
health conditions affect children’s behavior, the captain who
supervises all SROs employed by the department meets with each
SRO after an arrest to discuss whether an arrest was necessary in that
situation.338
The agreement is only legally binding for three years,339 making
ongoing legal instruments, like memoranda of agreement between the
department and school districts, of particular importance.

b.

Renegotiated Memoranda of Agreement

Local authorities also renegotiated memoranda of agreement
between the Richland County Sheriff’s Department and local school
districts. These renegotiated memoranda of agreement expand the
SRO program. In the 2017–2018 school year, the Richland County
School District Two will spend $230,000 more for SROs than it did at
the time of the Spring Valley incident.340 The sheriff’s department
will assign four additional SROs to the school district.341 Other
provisions largely follow the 2016 federal guidance—they are a step
forward from prior memoranda of agreement and discourage arrests
of students, but continue to require school administrators to report
any crime to SROs and leave individual SROs with the authority to
determine whether to arrest any individual student.
The revised Richland County memoranda have several elements
that track the 2016 federal guidance. They include several paragraphs
that “strongly encourage” SROs to use alternatives to arrest for
offenses such as disorderly conduct, trespassing, and loitering.342 And
they require the sheriff’s department and SROs to track and make
publicly available data regarding how frequently children are arrested
or charged and the race (and other details) of children arrested or
charged by SROs.343 The latter step was explicitly required in the
sheriff’s department’s agreement with the DOJ following the DOJ’s
investigation into its SROs.344
Despite those additions, the key legal points in these new
memoranda of agreement remain unchanged from the memoranda in
place at the time of the Spring Valley incident, and thus are less
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Telephone Interview with Captain John Ewing, supra note 327.
DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, ¶ 11.
2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 1.

Id.
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 2.

DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, ¶ 28, ¶ 45.
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legally effective than the voluntary agreement in separating law
enforcement from school discipline. Where the voluntary agreement
includes provisions to keep SROs out of incidents better handled by
school staff, the revised memoranda continue to require schools to
report incidents to SROs.345 The new memoranda emphasize in bold
font the pre-existing language stating that SROs are not school
disciplinarians but follow that language with the same troublesome
provision requiring schools to report any criminal activity to the
SRO.346 That provision threatens to turn SROs into disciplinarians,
whether in bold text or not. That risk is especially strong so long as
disturbing schools remains a criminal charge in its current form. One
might argue that if the disturbing schools bill is enacted and that law
can no longer apply to children properly at their own school, then this
provision in the memoranda will result in fewer cases referred to
SROs. But the wide range of other charges which could substitute—
and have substituted—for disturbing schools suggest that this MOA
provision will still require a wide range of behavior to be referred to
SROs. Moreover, this MOA language exceeds what the South
Carolina reporting statute requires. Under that law, schools must
only report conduct that results in injury or a serious threat of injury,
and gives school boards authority to define those terms,347 while the
memoranda require the reporting of any crime. Consistent with the
memoranda of agreement maintaining troublesome language
requiring schools to refer crimes to SROs, the relevant school district
policy continues to permit law enforcement involvement not only
when crime occurs, but in pure school discipline situations, when one
child’s behavior affects another’s “learning opportunities.”348

345. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 3, ¶ 1.
346. The renegotiated MOA reads:
The SRO shall not act as a school disciplinarian, as disciplining students is a
school responsibility. However, if the incident is a violation of the law, the
Principal shall contact the SRO or their supervisor in a timely manner and
the SRO shall then determine whether law enforcement action is
appropriate.
Id. at 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis in original). This is the same precise language as was included
in the prior MOA. See supra notes 202–03. The only difference is that the new MOA
places this language in a more prominent location and has bolded the first phrase.
See also 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 6, ¶ 30.
347. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994).
348. Supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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The memoranda ensure that SROs have discretion whether to
arrest or charge children for such incidents.349 This discretion
illustrates a concern raised by Barbara Fedders—that even improved
agreements can preserve police authority to determine when to arrest
children, thus limiting the effect of reforms.350 That concern is
particularly apt with the new memoranda because they are weaker
than the model memoranda of agreement identified in the 2016
federal guidance—while the latter make clear that a first time nonviolent misdemeanor should not lead to an arrest or charges,351 no
such limitation exists in the Richland County memoranda.
Jason Nance recommended that memoranda of agreement “specify
that SROs will not become involved in routine disciplinary
matters.”352 The MOA in effect for the Spring Valley incident and
the subsequently revised memoranda indicate that it does not suffice
to simply state that SROs should not engage in school discipline.
Memoranda of agreement should clearly prohibit schools from
referring children to SROs absent imminent safety risks,353 and
prohibit SROs from arresting children for minor non-violent offenses
unless the behavior is repeated and the school has tried other
interventions.
The revised memoranda’s continued requirement that schools
report all crime to SROs creates a tension with the voluntary
agreement. Under the memoranda, school officials are contractually
obligated to report misbehavior that amounts to minor crimes to
SROs.354 But under the voluntary agreement, SROs should consider
such behavior to be school discipline rather than law enforcement
matters, and not get involved.355 An important reform would be to
incorporate more of the voluntary agreement’s provisions into
memoranda of agreement, especially once the voluntary agreement
with the DOJ expires in 2019.

349. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 3 (“[T]he SRO shall
then determine whether law enforcement action is appropriate. . . . The discretion of
filing formal charges is left solely up to the SRO.”).
350. Fedders, supra note 41, at 585.
351. Supra note 325, at slide 16.
352. Nance, Rethinking Law Enforcement Officers in Schools, supra note 87, at
158.
353. Id.
354. 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 332, at 3, ¶ 1.
355. See 2017–18 Memoranda of Agreement, supra note 323, at 3.

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

140
2.

[Vol. XLV

South Carolina Department of Education Regulations

The South Carolina Department of Education promulgated
regulations which more effectively distinguish law enforcement from
school discipline by limiting when schools may refer behavior to
SROs.356 The regulations explicitly exempt certain conduct from the
list of crimes that must trigger automatic law enforcement referrals—
disturbing schools, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, affray, and
assault and battery which does not pose “a serious threat of injury or
result[ ] in physical harm.”357 Schools may refer such less severe
offenses to SROs “only when the conduct rises to a level of
criminality, and the conduct presents an immediate safety risk to one
or more people or it is the third or subsequent act which rises to a
level of criminality in that school year.”358 This language is based on
the Ferguson consent decree, which keeps SROs out of routine school
disciplinary incidents,359 and a leading interagency agreement, which
prevents arrests or prosecutions for a similar list of minor charges
unless a student has committed at least three offenses in the school

356. See 41(5) S.C. Reg. 57–65 (May 26, 2017), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/state_
register.php [https://perma.cc/WZK3-D7JY] (codified at S.C. Reg. 43-279 & 43-210).
Although an examination of the drafting history of these regulations is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is worth noting how various advocates’ efforts improved these
regulations. Shortly after the Spring Valley incident, the South Carolina Department
of Education convened a Safe Schools Task Force, which recommended new
regulation regarding SROs, and revisions to an existing regulation regarding school
discipline codes. See S.C. DEP’T EDUC., SOUTH CAROLINA SAFE SCHOOLS
TASKFORCE REPORT 5 (2016), http://ed.sc.gov/newsroom/public-informationresources/south-carolina-safe-schools-taskforce-report/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ8G-XD
SQ]. Those proposed regulations would not have prevented the Spring Valley
incident. The SRO regulation would have required memoranda of agreement but did
not require any specific limitations on the role of SROs. Id. at 17–18. And the
discipline regulation (like the MOA in effect for the Spring Valley incident) would
have required schools to report any criminal conduct, no matter how minor, to law
enforcement. Id. at 12 (proposed S.C. Reg. 43-279(IV)(B)(3)(d)). Following critical
comments from multiple advocates (including, in full disclosure, myself), the South
Carolina Senate Education Committee returned the regulations to the Department,
insisting that it revise them. Regulation Document Numbers 4657 & 4659 (reporting
that “Committee Requested Withdrawal” and that the regulations were “Withdrawn
and Resubmitted”), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/regnsrch.php [https://perma.cc/5K
SK-M74S]. The revisions included the limits on SRO contacts and law enforcement
referrals discussed in this section.
357. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-279(IV)(C)(2)(a) & (3) (2017). Exempting this list
of offenses echoes provisions of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department’s
voluntary agreement with the DOJ. See DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra
note 101, at 12–13, ¶ 55.
358. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS 43-279(IV)(B)(3)(d) & 43-210(IV)(A) (2017).
359. See supra notes 311–12 and accompanying text.
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year at issue.360 Further regulatory limits on law enforcement
referrals are not likely possible in South Carolina so long as the
statute requires referrals whenever an action “may result or results in
injury or serious threat of injury.”361
The regulation requires law enforcement agencies and school
districts to enter memoranda of agreement before placing SROs in
schools, and those memoranda must include the regulatory limitations
on SROs’ roles.362 This provision should require a re-evaluation of
the terms criticized in Section III.B.1 that continue to require schools
to refer all incidents that amount to a crime to SROs.
These regulations are the furthest reaching statewide reform since
the Spring Valley incident. They explicitly prevent referrals to law
enforcement for misdemeanor offenses—and do so more strongly
than the revised Richland County memoranda of agreement.363 By
limiting the number of cases that schools can refer to SROs, it avoids
the concern that authorities can simply re-label disturbing schools as
another offense.364 Quite simply, if law enforcement is not involved
in a school discipline situation, then law enforcement cannot arrest or
charge children in that situation.
Nonetheless, even these revised regulations would still permit
schools to inform SROs of any incident involving a petty crime that
the school interprets to pose a safety threat of any kind. The
regulation leaves it to schools to define what conduct “presents an
immediate safety risk” and to determine which such conduct they will
refer to SROs. The regulation also permits schools to determine
when a simple assault “poses a serious threat of injury or results in
physical harm” (and thus triggers an automatic law enforcement
referral).365 Reporting a child to law enforcement for refusing to put
a cell phone away, as in the Spring Valley incident, would likely have
been prohibited. But in common situations of school fights, any fight
could be reasonably feared to pose a threat of injury to others and
thus involve SROs. The effect of this promising new regulation,
therefore, will depend on how schools implement it.

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

See supra note 235.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994).
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-210(V) (2017).
See supra Section III.B.1.b.
See supra Section III.A.
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS 43-279(IV)(B)(3)(d) & (C)(2)(a) (2017).
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Other Pillars of the Pipeline

While Sections III.A and III.B summarize some impressive legal
reform efforts, those efforts only address a portion of the laws that
structure the school-to-prison pipeline. Several key pieces of the
pipeline’s legal architecture remain untouched by reform efforts.

1.

Reporting Statutes

First, there has been no effort to narrow the statute requiring
schools to report to law enforcement incidents posing a “serious
threat of injury” to a person or property.366 Juvenile justice law is
now evolving towards a less punitive and more rehabilitative model,
which includes questioning tough-on-crime era reforms such as this
reporting statute.367
But no bill challenging the reporting
requirement has been introduced in the South Carolina legislature.
Until that happens, many fights at school must, by law, be reported to
law enforcement, even when a school-based disciplinary intervention
is more appropriate. The statute includes language permitting
schools to define what level of injury or threat triggers this
requirement. At most, however, that language allows some school
districts to narrow their reporting obligations under this statute.
Naturally, only school districts that wish to narrow their obligations
will do so. As under the new state regulations, districts remain free to
report a broad range of incidents to law enforcement.

2.

Absence of School-Based Diversion Programs

Second, diversion programs have expanded—but they largely
continue to operate through law enforcement rather than through
schools. In Richland County, law enforcement-based programs are
growing pursuant to the Richland County Sheriff’s Department’s
voluntary resolution agreement with the DOJ. That agreement
requires SROs to use the “least coercive measures” possible in
response to students, including “restorative justice approaches.”368 In
addition, the agreement requires that the sheriff’s department train
366. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994).
367. See Sayali Himanshu Bapat & Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Is There Justice

for Juveniles in the United States, India, and Italy?: Towards a Framework for
Transnational Comparisons, in THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: PROCEDURE AND

PRACTICE FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 37, 45–46 (Tamar R. Birckhead &
Solange Mouthaan eds., 2016).
368. DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, at 12–13, ¶ 55(d); see
also id. at 13, ¶ 58 (listing restorative justice practices as possible means to address
student misbehavior).
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SROs in any school-based restorative justice or other diversion
programs,369 and to maximize use of all available programs.370 On a
statewide level, the revised state disciplinary regulations list
restorative justice and other interventions as alternatives to more
punitive interventions for student misconduct.371
But neither the voluntary agreement nor the new state regulations
actually create (or require districts to create) diversion programs
operated through school systems.372 Such programs have grown
slightly, but remain sparse. The revised Richland County memoranda
of agreement encourage SROs to access diversion programs, but note
that they are operated through the Richland County Sheriff’s
Department Youth Services Division.373
Small school-based
restorative justice programs exist in a small number of local school
districts in the state. The Richland One School District has a pilot
restorative justice program run with law student volunteers, but the
program was so small as to not be included on the district’s website as
of this writing.374 The Charleston School District announced plans to
start restorative justice programs in three schools in the 2017–2018
school year.375 These are hopeful but small steps and there has been
no concerted effort as yet to develop such programs statewide. Law
enforcement involvement thus remains essential to accessing
diversion programs.

3.

Prosecutorial Discretion

Third, there has been no legal reform effort to reconsider how
authorities determine which charges to prosecute and which to divert

369. See id. at 14, ¶ 59(d) & 17, ¶ 66(e).
370. See id. at 9, ¶ 38.
371. 41(5) S.C. Reg. 60 (May 26, 2017), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/state_
register.php [https://perma.cc/UL67-XRN6] (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43279(IV)(B)(3)(c) (2017)).
372. For the voluntary agreement, see DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra
note 101. For the regulations, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (1994).
373. See DOJ COMPLIANCE REVIEW LETTER, supra note 101, at 3.
374. See Email from Brittney Alls, Richland One School District Ombudsman, to
author (Jan. 25, 2017) (on file with author).
375. See Email from Jennifer Coker to Heather Goergen, Juris Doctor Candidate,
University of South Carolina School of Law (June 13, 2017, 7:38 AM EDT) (on file
with author) (“We are just beginning our Restorative Practices initiative in 2017–
2018 with 3 schools . . . .”). This effort follows a revision to the Charleston school
district’s discipline code, which explicitly identified a category of less serious
misbehavior as incidents that should be “Teacher Managed.” Email from Jennifer
Coker to Heather Goergen, Juris Doctor Candidate, University of South Carolina
School of Law (July 14, 2017, 3:30 PM EDT) (on file with author).
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or dismiss. Consider what could happen even if reformers succeed in
narrowing disturbing schools statutes and in limiting rules for when
schools may refer incidents to SROs. SROs will still be present in
schools, and will still have the potential to arrest and charge students
for misbehavior better dealt with at school. SROs could encounter
fights in the hallway, or school officials could report incidents to
SROs (even in violation of the statute). The school could even skip
the SRO and file charges directly.376 How would individual children
fight resulting charges? Indeed, even if school officials reported the
incident to an SRO in violation of the new state regulations, nothing
in those revised regulations or existing MOAs provides individual
children with a direct legal remedy. Absent such a remedy, it is not
difficult to imagine school districts violating the spirit, if not the letter
of the regulation, and continuing to involve law enforcement in a
range of student misbehavior. And it is similarly easy to imagine law
enforcement encountering incidents at school and arresting or filing
charges against children.
In such cases, the question then becomes whether authorities
prosecute such charges and, if they do, how the child might fight
them. Limited data in South Carolina’s record suggests that agencies
are more likely to consider whether prosecuting a particular child
serves the system’s rehabilitative goals and thus dismiss a case.377 The
ACLU’s examination of South Carolina data found that in twenty
percent of cases in which the agency recommended diverting children
accused of minor school-based offenses, elected prosecutors
overruled those recommendations and prosecuted the children.378 An

376. In South Carolina, anyone can file delinquency charges. See S.C. CODE
ANN. 63-19-1020 (2008). Although uncommon, several other statutes permit anyone
to file delinquency cases. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-121(A) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN.
10, § 1003 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260B.141(subd. 1) (West 1999) &
260C.141(subd. 1) (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-B:6 (2014) & 169-C:7 (2017);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A)(1) (West 2017); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6334(a)
(2014); 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-11(b) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-119 (1970).
I have called for states to remove this authority, which is a relic of the early family
court, in favor of juvenile justice authorities screening all such referrals to determine
the strength of the evidence of a crime and whether prosecution is necessary to
rehabilitate a child, an analysis that should include whether the incident is better
handled at school. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 28.
377. Cf. supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text.
378. Kenny v. Wilson Complaint, supra note 64, ¶ 78 (“In about twenty percent of
cases in which DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice] recommended diversion,
solicitor’s offices moved forward with prosecution.”). An academic empirical study
of this hypothesis is currently underway in South Carolina. Several colleagues and I
are surveying county practices to determine in which counties prosecutors make
decisions without consulting the Department of Juvenile Justice and in which
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agency model would lend itself to judicial review of decisions to
prosecute cases, especially when the agency failed to seriously
consider whether such prosecution served the child’s or the public’s
interest.379 However, there has been no movement towards such a
model, nor has there been any movement to change how prosecutors
determine which charges to prosecute.
CONCLUSION
The Spring Valley incident of 2015 and South Carolina’s broader
experience illustrate much about the school-to-prison pipeline’s legal
architecture—both how the law permits the pipeline to operate and
how legal reforms can address it. The incident did not result from a
single law or legal practice, but from several—the presence of broad
criminal laws, the wide presence of SROs in schools, absence of
effective limits on those officers’ roles, and prosecutorial discretion
that does not adequately consider whether specific incidents warrant
juvenile prosecutions.380 Even when the widely recommended step of
establishing memoranda of agreements governing SROs is taken, it is
insufficient when those memoranda do not impose meaningful limits
on when schools can refer students to SROs or when SROs can arrest
students.381
Finally, concentrating diversion programs in law
enforcement and prosecution agencies helps lead cases to those
agencies, including cases that could be better handled through
programs operated at schools without the involvement of law
enforcement.382
Post-Spring Valley efforts to reform the law to limit the school-toprison pipeline have been heartening in multiple respects. First, the
existence of meaningful (however incomplete) reforms in a
jurisdiction with a particularly active pipeline demonstrates that
reform can happen anywhere.383 The dramatic statewide decline in
disturbing schools charges should be celebrated. Second, the
transition of local officials involved in this incident—the sheriff and
administrators of the affected school district—into advocates for legal
reform is notable, and provided advocates with prominent support of

counties DJJ recommends whether to prosecute or not specific cases to prosecutors,
and whether varying procedures correlate with different outcomes.
379. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 28.
380. See supra Section I.A.
381. See supra Section III.B.
382. See supra Section II.C.
383. See supra Section II.D.
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certain reform efforts.384 The decline in arrests by Richland County
SROs is particularly dramatic,385 and suggests that the voluntary
agreement terms which led to that decline should be incorporated
through memoranda of agreement and elsewhere across the state.
Those reforms, however, remain incomplete, and they illustrate
several lessons for advocates in South Carolina and elsewhere. First,
while incremental reform may be necessary, advocates must be clear
that success on one or two elements does not render the job complete.
In particular, this Article has demonstrated how narrowing criminal
statutes—while positive and important—will not stop authorities from
arresting and charging children for relatively minor offenses at school
in some states.386 Legislatures should narrow such statutes, but that is
a first, not a last step.
Second, statewide rules limiting schools’ ability to make law
enforcement referrals are possible. The most dramatic statewide
reform in South Carolina thus far has been the state Department of
Education’s new regulations limiting when schools can refer children
to law enforcement.387 Prohibiting such referrals for minor offenses,
absent repeat offenses or an imminent safety risk, is a dramatic
development which could serve as a model for other state regulations
or statutes.388 States, including South Carolina, should repeal statutes
requiring schools to report broad sets of crimes to law enforcement,
and states should consider enacting statutes or regulations like South
Carolina’s prohibiting the reporting of minor crimes absent
immediate safety risks or repeat offenses.389
Third, stronger memoranda of agreement between schools and law
enforcement agencies are essential. An MOA simply stating that
SROs do not engage in school discipline did not prevent the Spring
Valley incident, especially when the MOA required schools to report
all crimes to SROs.390 It is unlikely that more clearly encouraging
SROs to avoid arrests will have a dramatic effect, especially when the
MOA continues to require schools to report all crimes to SROs.391
School districts and law enforcement agencies should reconsider such
384. Both the Richland County sheriff and Richland County School District Two
superintendent advocated narrowing the disturbing schools’ statute. See Roldán,
supra note 255.
385. See supra Section III.B.1.
386. See supra Section III.A.
387. See supra Section III.B.2.
388. See supra Section III.B.2.
389. See supra Section III.B.2.
390. See supra Section III.B.
391. See supra Section III.B.
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terms, and include more explicit limitations on SROs’ roles such as
those included in South Carolina’s new regulation and in the
Richland County Sheriff’s Department’s voluntary agreement with
DOJ.392
Fourth, reformers should consider all the different authorities that
may be able to influence relevant points of law. Individual school
districts develop discipline codes, establish (or do not establish)
diversion programs within their schools, and negotiate memoranda of
agreement with law enforcement agencies.393 Advocacy with those
local entities, in addition to the statewide advocacy that has already
occurred, is an important piece of the puzzle.394
These steps, coupled with advocacy for reforms that are beyond the
scope of this Article (such as improving teacher and SRO training,
and developing positive school culture that does not depend on law
enforcement), have great promise for preventing future Spring Valley
incidents and for significantly narrowing the school-to-prison
pipeline.

392. See supra Section III.B.
393. See generally supra Part II.
394. See generally supra Section I.C.2.

